Political policing: from Britain to Malaysia – Part 2



According to Leon Comber, a scholar of the Malayan Special Branch and a former officer, the Malayan Special Branch was established in Kuala Lumpur at the same time as the Singapore Branch. Details of Special Branch operations on the peninsula prior to 1939 are scant. However, it has been suggested that it initially had closer ties to the Indian Special Branch, though later the London Metropolitan Special Branch came into its orbit. In any case, after a hiatus during the Japanese Occupation, the Malayan Special Branch was re-formed in August 1948 after the abolition of its predecessor, the Malayan Security Service (1939-48), which had combined both Malayan and Singaporean Special Branches.

The Malayan Branch’s role in the war against the communists (1948-60) is fairly well understood. Because the insurgency was primarily a political conflict – the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)/Malayan Communist Party (MCP) aspired to independence and a communist state whilst the British sought to preserve colonialism – the political affiliation of non-combatants would prove decisive. Beyond political support, the guerrillas of the MNLA/MCP depended on civilians for supplies. Blocking or severing these links would drain the nurturing ‘sea’ of the people from the guerrilla ‘fish’ who sought nourishment from it, thereby reversing Mao’s famous injunction for guerrillas to be as fish swimming within the sea of the people.

Thus, in the struggle for ‘hearts and minds,’ the Special Branch used intelligence operations to uncover, undermine, and counteract guerrilla activities. The Branch was responsible for identifying MNLA/MCP members and sympathisers, often via interrogation and the co-optation of MNLA/MCP members into imperial service.

The Branch’s operations have generally been acknowledged as tremendously successful, if not decisive, in the prosecution of the counter-insurgency. This article will not go into detail about the balance of factors which led to the results of the conflict; however, interested readers can refer to Leon Comber’s Malaya’s Secret Police 1945-60 and Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. Some broader social and political consequences are addressed in the subsequent section, however.

By 1967, the Malaysian Branch’s functions were codified in the Police Act. Its stated focus was to “gather and process security risks in order to protect national laws and national security whilst preserving peace and security.” Of course, with a statement of purpose such as this, for those concerned with the morality of how order is policed, much hangs upon the quality and disposition of national laws and how national security concerns are defined.

We can see similarities between the Special Branch of independent Malaysia and the colonial Branches in that their role has been to secure the political integrity of their respective regimes from domestic and foreign threats to hegemony.

The expanded scope of this role was displayed most prominently during Operasi Lallang in 1987. Social activists, religious leaders, and opposition politicians were targeted in the crackdown. Also included in the sweep were the plaintiffs of the Asian Rare Earth factory case and their lawyers.

We can trace a similar expansion of focus in the London Metropolitan Special Branch. Like the Malayan Branch, the London one began to conduct operations on social activists who challenged the legitimacy of political and development decisions. As mentioned previously, not long after its founding, the early London Branch was soon arresting women campaigning for suffrage, and over the decades they expanded their operations to include anti-nuclear activists, anti-war campaigners, and environmentalists.

These groups could not readily be described as sources or agents of terrorism or threats to national security except by the most conspiratorially-minded or the most politically opportunistic. However, such groups do represent dissent towards a socio-political order founded upon patriarchy, imperialism, and industrial vested interests. From the standpoint of such authoritarian or imperialist states it is true that dissidents present a threat to the former’s legitimacy and stability.

Thus, the Malayan Special Branch shared similar characteristics and functions to the other Special Branches around theBritish Empire. It served to protect and defend the Empire from its immediate enemies – anti-colonial independence movements – but, like the London Branch, it also began to mobilise against challenges to the broader socio-political order even if they took non-violent forms. One cannot fail to note that this extension of the scope of operations, and even the defence of imperialism itself, stood in contradiction to the values of liberal parliamentary democracy.

Entwined Branches

Although the Malayan Special Branch has been hailed for its role in defeating communist insurgency inMalaya, I believe there is a more complicated conclusion to consider.

The overall counter-insurgency strategy undertaken by the British and Alliance government has been hailed as a model for counter-insurgency in general. To summarise, the approach combined military engagement under the control of police and civilian government with socio-economic development programmes, and a coordinated propaganda and subversion programme – the famous ‘hearts and minds’ approach. The Special Branch played a key role in propaganda, intelligence gathering, and ‘turning over’ communist fighters to become intelligence and military tools for the colonial forces.

In recent years, senior U.S. Army officers who were keen to develop an effective strategy to guarantee the stable conquest of Iraq have turned to the Malayan example, in comparison with their past failure inVietnam.

The problem with the numerous positive appraisals of the Malayan counter-insurgency approach is that they have been quite short-sighted. Whether for scholarly convenience or out of policy-making myopia, they have looked at the so-called ‘Emergency’ as a neatly bounded historical entity. It is something that begins in 1948 and a line is drawn under it in 1960. Mission accomplished. British interests in Southeast Asia are preserved. A new democracy under British tutelage is birthed. Commie dominoes are prevented from falling. And so forth.

However, for those of us who have had to live in post-1960 Malaysia we know that the full consequences of those strategies do not stop there. Above and beyond its counter-communist activities, the Special Branch extended its operations to monitor and regulate peaceful dissent, social work, the performing arts, political opposition, and media. By the 1980s the Special Branch was not only policing armed insurgents, it was also policing civil society, broadly understood.

Compared to the size of the United Kingdom’s Special Branch before it was merged into the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Command in 2006, the Malaysian Special Branch represents a disproportionate ratio of officers to citizens. In 2003, the United Kingdom’s Special Branch numbered 4,247 officers over a population of 59.4 million, or approximately one Special Branch officer to every 14,000 citizens. In 2010,Malaysia had 9,130 Special Branch officers over a population of 28.3 million, or approximately one Special Branch officer to every 3,100 Malaysians. By manpower alone, this would make Malaysia four and a half times more politically policed than the United Kingdom.

It is noteworthy that the Malaysian Criminal Investigation Department only has 249 more staff than the Special Branch and Internal Security (including the Federal Reserve Unit (FRU), the Light Strike Force, and “General Forces”) has more than 40,000 staff. That the size of the Internal Security division is only exceeded by Management suggests that it is reasonable to consider the Royal Malaysian Police as a paramilitary force.