PAS treading a political tightrope
Formed in 1951, PAS is one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia. The size of its critical ethnic Malay support base is second only to that of Umno, the senior partner in the ruling Barisan Nasional government. Over the years, PAS has undergone several transformations, uncanny for a “fundamentalist” Islamic party.
By Joseph Chinyong Liow, For The Straits Times
HAVING made major inroads at the 2008 Malaysian election, the opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition believes that it is now within a hair’s breadth of victory.
While the stakes are undoubtedly high for all three of Pakatan’s component parties, they are arguably highest for the Islamic opposition party, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). This is because in toeing the Pakatan line, no party has compromised – or risked – as much as PAS, with so little clarity on the road ahead.
The result of the election will determine whether the progressives in the party, who have firmly nailed their colours to the Pakatan mast, get to shape the future for the party. If the party does not do well, PAS’ evolution towards a more inclusivist register could come to a screeching halt.
Formed in 1951, PAS is one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia. The size of its critical ethnic Malay support base is second only to that of Umno, the senior partner in the ruling Barisan Nasional government. Over the years, PAS has undergone several transformations, uncanny for a “fundamentalist” Islamic party.
PAS was formed as an Islamic socialist party that was sympathetic to Indonesian president Sukarno’s brand of nationalism in the 1960s, only to morph into a staunchly ethno-nationalist Malay party in the 1970s. The latter transformation culminated in its ill-fated entry into the Barisan Nasional and unceremonious exit four years later.
Caught up in the throes of Islamic revivalism and the Iranian revolution in the early 1980s, PAS traded its ethno-nationalist credentials for religion. Under clerical rule, the party became a strong proponent of the implementation of an Islamic state in Malaysia. Led by the late Fadzil Noor, however, PAS was revitalised by the reformasi movement of the late 1990s.
Since then, a strongly reformist and progressive faction has gained a foothold and flourished. This faction, which today finds itself significantly represented in the Central Working Committee, the vice-presidencies and deputy presidency, has been active in expressing the Islamic party’s commitment to the Pakatan Rakyat.
Still, the path to multi-ethnic cooperation has been riddled with potholes for PAS, many of which continue to pose significant challenges for the party leadership. The first signs of strain were evident immediately after the 2008 elections, when PAS was approached by a weakened Umno to explore cooperation in the name of Malay-Muslim unity.
What followed was two tedious years of confusion and tension within the party. The more conservative elements were prepared to embrace the logic of Malay-Muslim unity as they harboured reservations about their new allies in the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). The opportunists were seduced by Umno’s offer of Cabinet posts.
But the progressives managed to hold firm even as they struggled to reinforce the party’s commitment to Pakatan. They were able to do this because both conservatives and opportunists eventually toned down their own rhetoric for reasons of political expediency as Pakatan’s fortunes gradually improved.
Perhaps the greatest test of PAS’ resolve came in 2010, when the party was forced to take a stand on a Malaysian court ruling to allow non-Muslims the right to use the term “Allah”.
After intense discussions within the party leadership, the shura council, and the dewan ulama, PAS ended up standing alongside their Pakatan counterparts to endorse the ruling. The decision, however, was a difficult one for PAS, and threatened to split the party. It also caused consternation among the rank and file, resulting in the loss of all four by-elections that PAS contested following the “Allah” controversy, in Galas (Kelantan), Tenang (Johor), Merlimau (Malacca), and Kerdau (Pahang).
This fact was certainly not lost on party strategists. The controversy was reignited late last year during a Christmas speech made by DAP leader Lim Guan Eng, and PAS was forced to clarify its position yet again. In the event, PAS responded by muddying the waters. It now takes the position that while non-Muslims can use the term orally, the use of “Allah” as a translation of “God” or “Lord” is forbidden.
PAS’ recent equivocal take on the issue surely factored in ground sentiments, where numerous surveys by independent firms showed that the majority of Malay-Muslim respondents believed the use of the term should be the exclusive prerogative of Muslims. At the same time, the party is also cognizant of the fact that its own rank and file harbours deep concern that the party’s ideological pendulum has swung too far towards the ecumenical views of the Pakatan.
Some within PAS also continue to be suspicious of their Pakatan allies. Concerning this, two observations need to be made. First, conservative elements in the party leadership have only grudgingly endorsed Mr Anwar Ibrahim as the opposition’s choice of prime minister. There is certainly no love lost between Mr Anwar and the PAS old guard who crossed swords with him on numerous occasions before he was ignominiously removed from power. He was, after all, Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s weapon of choice against the religious credentials of the PAS clerics. In many respects, that tension still lingers.
To make a point, PAS has occasionally put forward its president Abdul Hadi Awang as an alternative to Mr Anwar as prime minister. As recently as two weeks ago, attempts by Mr Anwar to meet privately with Datuk Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat were apparently rebuffed by the PAS spiritual leader. Second, apprehension towards the DAP runs deep in some quarters. Several prominent DAP leaders continue to be referred to privately in PAS circles as “anti-Islamic”. The party’s rank and file also remains keenly aware of DAP’s staunch opposition to the Islamic state.
If the Pakatan’s electoral fortunes falter, conservative segments in PAS will likely reassess the party’s commitment to the opposition coalition as the dividends for its compromises fail to materialise.
But even if the opposition coalition wins the election, PAS will find itself at a difficult fork in the road. The party is already in danger of bringing up the Pakatan rear. In several seats, PAS is in the unfamiliar position of having to rely on non-Muslim votes to turn things in its favour. When the party undertakes its election post-mortem, this will surely be a hotly debated issue.
But even if its performance pales in comparison to DAP or PKR, by virtue of being on the winning side, PAS could see itself in the role of kingmaker. This would surely prompt a rethink in some quarters of PAS about the party’s core purpose, and the best avenues through which it can be furthered.
The progressives in PAS are unwavering in their commitment to Pakatan. But the fact of the matter is that theirs is not the only voice in the party.