ASEAN non-interference and the Sabah conflict
Yet while the regional organisation has trumpeted its ‘central role’ in maintaining peace, security and stability in a region which has experienced both internal and intra-member conflicts since post-independence, it is has so far been ‘silent’ on the Sabah crisis.
Imelda Deinla, New Mandala
The recent incursion into Sabah of more than 200 armed groups styling themselves as the Royal Army of the Sultan of Sulu has put another challenge to ASEAN’s claim to its centrality in the region.
There seems to be consensus that the Sabah conflict has become another flashpoint that has broader regional security implications for members of ASEAN. Yet while the regional organisation has trumpeted its ‘central role’ in maintaining peace, security and stability in a region which has experienced both internal and intra-member conflicts since post-independence, it is has so far been ‘silent’ on the Sabah crisis. The United Nations through Ban Ki Moon issued a statement two weeks after the incursion urging parties to end the violence through dialogue and to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Member countries were more adamant in not expressing their views with the exception of Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who remarked during a state visit to Hungary on 6 March 2013 that a diplomatic approach must be pursued in the future and called on ASEAN’s current chair, Brunei Darussalam, to take a proactive move to resolve the conflict peacefully.
There are two ways to interpret ASEAN’s lack of visibility in the Sabah crisis. One is that there is no willingness among member countries to ‘regionalise’ the conflict and a preference for treating it purely as an internal security matter primarily for Malaysia. In this way, the principle of non-interference on sovereignty is maintained. The fact however that the conflict involves cross-border actions and personalities from Malaysia and the Philippines belies its characterisation as an ‘internal’ matter. However, this is also indicative of an evolving pattern following the failure to reach a consensus on the South China last year, and the muted statements of ASEAN involving the skirmishes between Thai and Cambodian forces at the Preah Vijear temple in 2011.
Read more at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/03/22/asean-non-interference-and-the-sabah-conflict/