Free speech fanaticism
Different countries may define blasphemy differently but some common elements must be there. There must be a clear intention to wound religious feelings, a likelihood of breach of public order, and an element of religious insult or vilification.
Prof Shad Saleem Faruqi, The Star
THIS column on Oct 4 on “Hate speech hypocrisy” had argued that the right to free speech is not unlimited and carries concomitant responsibilities.
My article elicited a number of responses, some very learned, and I welcome them and wish to respond.
Sarachandran wrote that the perception among Muslims of their persecution is genuine and based on an objective overview of world happenings.
But “how would we weave into this paradigm the unprovoked destruction of priceless Buddhist iconic images by the Taliban and the mere murmuring protestations by the world community and deafening silence of enlightened Muslims?”
I totally agree with Sarachandran that we must not be selective in our condemnation and must take a stand against all atrocities no matter who the violator is and who the victim.
The first function of freedom is to free someone else.
Two readers asked about blasphemy against other religions besides the state religion. The answer to this has to be that the law must not be selective.
It must shield all religions against vilification. For example, the Malaysian Penal Code in section 298 contains the general offence of wounding religious feelings. The provision protects all faiths.
It must be acknowledged, however, that around the world the law on blasphemy is either discriminatory in its reach or administered unequally.
For a long time till its repeal in 2007, the UK law on blasphemy defined the offence only in relation to the Church of England.
Though the law was rarely enforced, the same effect was achieved by convicting those who insulted Jews under the common law offence of breach of peace.
However, when a Muslim citizen of Britain, humiliated by Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, filed a police report, the public prosecutor got cold feet. The citizen then tried to initiate a private prosecution but the High Court rejected his application.
In Greece and South Africa, blasphemy is only against the Christian Church. In the European Union, despite laudable activism in the cause of human rights of non-Muslims, constitutional jurisprudence is not free of anti-Islam bias.
For example, Muslims girls are prosecuted for wearing the hijab. Mosques with minarets are vigorously opposed because that would ruin the skyline.
Reader Buyung Adil raises a question about “who will define blasphemy?” My view is that the offence must be defined by law and tried before non-sectarian, civil courts.
Different countries may define the offence differently but some common elements must be there. There must be a clear intention to wound religious feelings, a likelihood of breach of public order, and an element of religious insult or vilification. Mere disagreements with or respectful criticism of religious rulings should not be prosecuted.
What penalty must be prescribed? One reader strongly argued against the death penalty and I totally agree.
Fines along with counselling and community engagement sessions may be adequate. The purpose should be to re-educate and banish the ignorance that leads to the prejudices on which hate speech is based.
Reader Buyung also asks the provocative question: “Why aren’t Buddhists, Hindus, Catholics, Protestants, Confucianists, Bahais, Zoroastrians creating violent terrorism over acts of blasphemy?”
This is a very large and involved question and only a few points can be explored.
First, it is probably true that deep, unquestioning veneration for their faith is more widespread in Muslim societies.
The militant secularism (e.g. the banning of Bible-reading in public schools as in the United States) is impossible in Muslim societies.
Secondly, it is not true that other civilisations do not indulge in religious-racial violence and persecution.
In the US, firebombing of black churches by white racist groups is known. Right-wing Christian groups destroy abortion clinics and shoot dead the patrons.
The Ku Klux Clan used to lynch blacks. During George Bush’s government, nearly 7,000 Muslims were profiled, detained and harassed.
Was there no religious violence in Ireland till the 70s – inquisitions and burning of heretics; Jew-baiting and discrimination against Catholics; and the holocaust in Europe? Are not Europe and the UN to be blamed for the genocide in former Yugoslavia?
Who committed and who helped the slaughters in Sabra, Shatila and Jenin?
In India, religious, caste and tribal violence is endemic. The Babri mosque was razed to the ground and Muslims were butchered in Gujarat with political and police connivance.
In Sri Lanka, race/religious violence claimed more than a hundred thousand lives. In Thailand and the Philippines, religious violence by both sides is well known.
Thirdly, reader Buyung implies that terrorism is a speciality of Muslims. Much depends on how one defines terrorism.
America’s actions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, Afghanistan, Iraq, Gautemala, Chile, Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Colombia, Congo/Zaire, Haiti, Somalia, Iran, Grenada, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic can also be defined as terrorist.
Israel’s brutalities in Palestine and Lebanon are flagrant violations of international law. Actually, humanity has a bloody record and no civilisation can claim superiority in this area.
What has happened today is that through selective demonstration and fear-mongering, the topic of Islamic terrorism is allowed to demonise a religious community.