Hence we are going to see a battle to decide not only the new Umno leadership but the direction Umno is to take over these next four or five years leading to the 14th General Election. Those who feel that Umno needs to appeal to the middle ground will back Najib. Those who feel that Najib has ‘sold out’ to the non-Malays will oppose him.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

Former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad is attempting to keep the divide within Umno under wraps with his call that the top two posts in the party not be contested, said political analyst Khoo Kay Peng.

He said that after Barisan Nasional’s poor performance in the general election, Umno is undergoing a period of uncertainty and is currently mulling two options.

The options are whether to become more Malay-centric in its approach or to convert BN into a single party for all races.

“Mahathir is trying to keep the fight between the respective factions in support of either options within Umno’s walls."

“If there is contest for the top posts, the battle may come out in the open and the party will become a target for its opponents,” said Khoo.

Yesterday, Mahathir backed the growing calls within Umno circles to leave Najib Tun Razak and Muhyiddin Yassin to remain party president and deputy president respectively.

He said the contest for the top two positions would split Umno, like what happened in 1987, when then Umno vice-president Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah challenged Mahathir for the presidency.

“Going by the democratic practice, we should have contests but Malaysians do not really understand the practice."

“If they lose, they will quit the party and set up another, causing the Malays and Umno to split further, “ Mahathir was reported as saying.

Khoo said that at the end of the day, it did not matter who was helming Umno as the real decision makers in the party would be its supreme council members.

“The real focus should be on its supreme council as they will decide on which direction the party president will have to take."

“So even if Najib wants to push forward his liberal ideas, his fate will be determined by the supreme council,” he said.

However as a democratic party, Khoo said Umno members should allow contest for all posts in the party.

“And Umno will see 150,000 of its delegates participating in the party election this time around,” he added.

Nottingham Malaysia University analyst Zaharom Nain said that it did not matter whether Najib or Muhyiddin led Umno as the right wing faction in the party is getting stronger.

“Would it really make much of a difference if it is Najib or Muhyiddin? Push comes to shove, aren’t they but mirror images of one other?"

“Indeed, bottom line is that the right-wing faction in Umno is getting stronger and both leaders are invariably constrained by this,” said Zaharom.

(READ MORE HERE)

***********************************************

Students of history will know that the tussle between King Henry VIII and Rome was more than just about getting the Pope’s permission to divorce his Queen. That is the more popular notion, of course, because that sounds more ‘romantic’. But there are other more crucial factors to be considered in the reason behind England’s break from Rome.

The church throughout Europe was very rich. The church owned 20% of the land and the noblemen another 20%. And the serfs paid the church (and the nobles) heavy taxes to work this land -- money that the church sent to Rome. Hence Rome was a source of ‘capital flight’ that for centuries had been ‘stealing’ the wealth of England.

Europe, England included, was perpetually involved in wars and this drained the treasury. It came to a stage that the state coffers had dried up and the only way the Crown could get its hands on more money was to raise taxes (which means, of course, tax the nobles) or confiscate the church's property (which was exempted from taxes) and stop the outflow of wealth to Rome.

Henry VIII decided on the latter and overnight the King of England became the richest monarch in Europe (after hovering on the verge of bankruptcy). He, of course, had to burn the Catholic churches and kill all the Catholic priests in the process.

King Charles I, about 100 years later, faced the same financial crisis that Henry VIII faced -- and for the same reason as well, wars. But there were no church properties to confiscate so be raised taxes (meaning the nobles now had to pay higher taxes).

This upset the nobles who protested (together with the rakyat, who the nobles transferred the increased taxes to) and this caused a split between the pro-monarchs and the anti-monarchs. Not long after that the English Civil War broke out and England became a Republic after the execution of the King.

Just like in the case of Henry VIII, the popular notion is that Charles and Parliament disagreed on issues involving Christianity. Hence it was a ‘Sunni-Shia’ conflict of sorts. However, money was very much the factor in all this with religion being the excuse to go to war.

And so on and so forth for all the other conflicts and revolutions throughout Europe as well over 100 years from the early 1800s to the early 1900s. At the end of the day, money was always the reason to go to war and to kill each other -- with other factors being cited as the more ‘noble’ reason.

The point to all these stories is that what you see is not always what you get. You think you know the reason for what happened -- or for what is going on -- but you never really know what is ‘behind the scenes’.

So, what do you understand about what is currently going on in Umno? Is this about the recent general election on 5th May 2013? Is this about how poorly Najib Tun Razak performed compared to Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi on 8th March 2008?

Actually, Umno is not concerned about the results of the recent general election -- or at least they are not too concerned. They already knew back in 2012 that the best-case scenario was a win of 145 Parliament seats and the worst-case scenario was only 130 seats. Hence 133 seats is still within the ‘boundary’ although not as good as the 140 seats in 2008. And they won the states they expected to win and lost the states they expected to lose. So no big deal there as well.

So what is really going on in Umno then if this is not an aftershock to the 5th May 2013 general election? After all, Umno did increase its seats to 88 from just 79 in 2008. So it actually performed better by winning an additional nine seats.

What is going on in Umno is a power struggle between the rightists and the centrists. Umno is finally trying to decide whether it will move in the direction that Najib would like to bring it -- that is, to be more liberal -- or to move more towards the right -- that is, to be more Malay-centric and nationalistic.

Najib represents the face of liberal Umno. And the ultra-Malays do not like that. These people feel that Najib wasted his time in trying too hard to become a Prime Minister for all Malaysians when the non-Malays want Umno dead anyway. And the voting pattern of the non-Malays, in particular the Chinese, in the recent general election proved that Najib was barking up the wrong tree.

These people are of the opinion that Najib should have focused on the Malays and should have spent more resources on the Malays rather than try to woo the non-Malays. And the voting pattern proved that there is no way Umno can woo the non-Malays, not even with money, budgets and promises of this, that and the other.

Even the Umno ‘running dogs’ such as MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PPP, etc., which used to be able to get a reasonable level of non-Malay support in the past, can no longer do so. And PSY and his ‘Gangnam Style’ could not do it as well.

The 5th May 2013 ‘wakeup call’ did wake Umno up. It is not that it did not. In fact, Umno already ‘woke up’ back in March 2008. It is just that they took a long time to stir out of bed after waking up. But now Umno has fully woken up to the fact that it needs to get its house in order.

But what do we mean by ‘getting its house in order’? Your interpretation of what that means may not be quite the same as Umno’s interpretation. To me, getting your house in order means more liberalism and democracy so that you can appeal to the ‘middle ground’. To the rightists in Umno, ‘getting its house in order’ would mean being more Malay-centric and nationalistic so that you can appeal to the rural and nationalist Malays.

Hence we are going to see a battle to decide not only the new Umno leadership but the direction Umno is to take over these next four or five years leading to the 14th General Election. Those who feel that Umno needs to appeal to the middle ground will back Najib. Those who feel that Najib has ‘sold out’ to the non-Malays will oppose him.

It does not matter whether Najib is going to be challenged or not in the party’s general assembly. Pak Lah was not challenged either. Pak Lah was not ousted during the general assembly. He was ousted after that. And that too will be when Najib is going to be ousted if he is ousted -- after the general assembly.

And if Najib is ousted that is going to mean only one thing -- and that is Umno is moving to the right and the liberals in Umno will no longer have a voice. And that can only bring Malaysia deeper into racial politics at the risk of exploding some time in the future to fulfill Lim Kit Siang’s prophecy of a time bomb ticking away in Malaysia.

Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was Dr Mahathir who appointed Najib as the Deputy Prime Minister and not Pak Lah who did so. Pak Lah did not ‘confirm’ Dr Mahathir’s announcement until the following day. Pak Lah really had no choice in the matter after Dr Mahathir had publicly ‘thanked’ him for ‘agreeing’ to appoint Najib as the Deputy Prime Minister.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

It appears like we will not be seeing a contest for ‘number one’ and ‘number two’ this coming Umno general assembly. Of course, this is not the first time this has happened. Since the historic ‘Team A’ versus ‘Team B’ tussle of 26 years ago -- when the Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah-Musa Hitam team took on the Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad-Ghafar Baba team -- Umno has not tolerated any contest for the top two posts.

This is mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, the 1987 contest split Umno into two and resulted in Umno getting deregistered (followed by the fall of Kelantan in the 1990 general election). Secondly, the President and Deputy President of Umno will become Malaysia’s Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. Hence Umno would not just be choosing its top two party leaders but the top two leaders of the country as well.

No doubt this ‘no contest’ ruling can be considered as technically illegal because all party posts should be open for contest. But then Umno’s ‘system’ allows for the party’s supreme council to make rulings that are final and that cannot be challenged in court or overridden by the Registrar of Societies. Therefore democracy can be suspended for the sake of ‘stability’.

This may appear strange and even undemocratic to the uninitiated. However, Malaysia is full of contradictions and these contradictions have been accepted as necessary for the sake of ‘peace and stability’. I mean, while the Federal Constitution says that there is freedom of assembly, the police can still arrest you for organising and attending an ‘illegal assembly’. And while the Constitution says you cannot be detained without being informed of your crime and that you must be brought before a magistrate or released within 24 hours, you can still be detained without trial and without legal representation for an indefinite period of time.

Many say that Malaysia does not allow freedom of speech or freedom of assembly and so on. I would disagree with that, though. Malaysia does allow freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. It is freedom AFTER speech and freedom AFTER assembly that you do not have. Hence you do have freedom to do what you want to do. It is whether you will still enjoy this freedom after you do it that is the issue.

Anyway, many think that the ‘no contest for number one and number two’ is aimed at saving Najib Tun Razak. They think that to allow a contest would mean that Najib might be challenged and would possibly be ousted. I have a deep suspicion that this is not about saving Najib but about saving Muhyiddin Yassin.

If there is a contest for number one and number two, two things may happen. One would be that Muhyiddin takes on Najib. Muhyiddin might win or he might lose. However, taking Malay sentiments into consideration where challenging the boss is seen as biadap (insolent), the chance of Muhyiddin losing is stronger than the chance of him winning.

The second scenario would be that no one might challenge Najib but someone might challenge Muhyiddin instead. And if Muhyiddin loses, then Najib would be very secure and unshakable -- as the only alternative for successor, Muhyiddin, would now be out in the cold.

That is a risk they would not like to take. And you cannot say that the number one post is open to challenge while the number two is not. Either both posts are open to challenge or both are not. So better they do not open any of the posts to a challenge, just in case.

Their main worry is not so much about Muhyiddin taking on Najib (in fact, many are hoping he would). If Muhyiddin does take on Najib that would mean the number two post would now be ‘vacant’ (since Muhyiddin is going for number one) and it would be open season for the number two post.

Let’s say Muhyiddin takes on Najib and wins. Najib would now be out and Muhyiddin would become the new Prime Minister. That would mean Malaysia no longer has a Deputy Prime Minister. But who is going to become the new Deputy Prime Minister, one of the three Vice Presidents? Bloody hell, you know who they are, right?

That is the crux of the matter. Who is going to take over as Deputy Prime Minister if Muhyiddin takes over as Prime Minister? That is a thought that is sending shivers down the spine of the behind-the-scenes ‘kingmakers’. Hence it is a risk they would not like to take.

They faced this same dilemma when Dr Mahathir handed the reins to Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Pak Lah) on 1st November 2003. For 15 months from mid-2002 Dr Mahathir and Pak Lah hammered out a deal on what will happen once Pak Lah takes over. And one of the terms of this deal was that Najib would be appointed the Deputy Prime Minister.

However, once Pak Lah took over, he dragged his feet and refused to confirm Najib as his Deputy. It was not until Dr Mahathir put a gun to Pak Lah’s head that Najib was appointed the Deputy Prime Minister on 7th January 2004 -- more than two months after Pak Lah took over as Prime Minister. 

Pak Lah’s choice for Deputy was actually Muhyiddin and not Najib. Najib was Dr Mahathir’s choice. But Dr Mahathir shoved Najib down Pak Lah’s throat and he (Pak Lah) was powerless to say no mainly because the ‘Old Man’ publicly announced Najib’s appointment even though Pak Lah had not said anything.

Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was Dr Mahathir who appointed Najib as the Deputy Prime Minister and not Pak Lah who did so. Pak Lah did not ‘confirm’ Dr Mahathir’s announcement until the following day. Pak Lah really had no choice in the matter after Dr Mahathir had publicly ‘thanked’ him for ‘agreeing’ to appoint Najib as the Deputy Prime Minister.

That was basically the beginning of the end for Pak Lah. Dr Mahathir realised that the 15 months of ‘sorting out the issues’ from mid-2002 to 1st November 2003 between him and Pak Lah was a deal gone sour. After that Pak Lah cancelled the Crooked Bridge, the Double-Tracking Project, and so on. That further infuriated Dr Mahathir.

The straw that broke the camel’s back was on midnight of 2nd September 2004, a few hours after Anwar Ibrahim was released from jail on the charge of sodomy. Unknown to most, Pak Lah’s son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddiin, sneaked into Anwar’s house through the kitchen to meet Anwar. This meeting was arranged by the then PKR Youth Leader, Ezam Mohd Nor.

When I found out about this clandestine meeting I immediately wrote about it in Malaysia Today and the next morning there was a lot of brouhaha when Umno demanded an explanation. Pak Lah then explained that Khairy went to meet Anwar to hand him his international passport.

But Khairy was not the Minister of Home Affairs or the head of the Immigration Department. So why should he go to meet Anwar to hand him his passport? Nevertheless, Umno gave Pak Lah the benefit of the doubt, never mind how incredible the explanation may have sounded -- until the following day when The Star published a photograph of Anwar going to the Immigration office to collect his passport.

Pak Lah had lied. Khairy’s midnight visit to Anwar’s house was not to hand him his passport, as what Pak Lah had said. The Star had revealed this lie. Hence what was the purpose of Khairy’s visit?

Later it was revealed that Pak Lah was in discussion with Anwar, through Khairy, for his (Anwar’s) return to Umno. Pak Lah knew that Dr Mahathir was after his balls and he thought that an alliance with Anwar (if Anwar returns to Umno, of course) would be the sensible strategy to adopt.

Pak Lah admitted that there actually was such a negotiation. However, since Umno was bitterly opposed to this move, he had no choice but to abort the plan -- and Anwar went on to become the de facto head of PKR, and the Opposition Leader in Parliament in September 2008, four years after he was released from jail.

And is this why Najib allegedly met up with Anwar in Indonesia, a meeting that was allegedly arranged by Pak Lah (and a story that has been denied)? Does Najib know that his time is up and he, too, is seeking an alliance with Anwar to fend off any possible onslaught from Dr Mahathir?

Well, that issue will have to be addressed in part three of this series -- so stay tuned.

************************************ 

寻找接班人

所以说，一开始就是老马把纳吉钦点为副首相的，而不是伯拉。伯拉并没有第一时间站出来确定老马的发言，是直到第二天他才那么做的。伯拉他根本就没得选，因为老马已公开地‘感谢’他‘委任’纳吉为副首相了。

看起来此届巫统党选大会中我们将看不到第一把交椅和第二把交椅之战。这当然并不是第一次发生的，自从26年前巫统那场AB队之战后（东姑拉扎利和慕沙希旦对垒敦马和嘉化巴巴），巫统就再也不容许任何领导位竞争了。

这背后是由两个原因的。第一，1987年的那一场竞争把巫统给分裂了而搞得被吊销执照（再来的就是他们在1990年失去了吉兰丹政权）。第二，巫统主席和署理主席将会直接成为大马正副首相，所以说巫统不只是选他们党内的领导而已，他们也在选着国家领导。

毫无疑问的，这个‘不得参选’的规则其实是犯法的，因为基本上所有党职都应该公开地被竞争。但巫统的‘系统’是允许党内最高理事会立定规则而其规则是连法庭或注册局也不能推翻的。所以说，在‘安稳’当前民主也是必须让步的。

这可能看起来很奇怪，甚至是不民主。无论如何，马来西亚是充满矛盾的，而这些矛盾都会被视为能维持国家的‘安定繁荣’而被接受。我的意思是，虽然说宪法赐予你集会的权利，但警方还是可以因你策划和参加‘非法集会’而逮捕你。虽然宪法也说一个人不能再没有被告知他犯了什么错的情况下被逮捕，和这个人被逮捕了以后一定要在24小时内会面法官或被释放，但你还是可以再没有被审讯的情况下遭无限期地扣押。

很多人都说在马来西亚你没得自由地发言和集会，我对这一点感到不赞同。在马来西亚你是可以自由地发言和集会的；你没有的是发言以后和集会以后的自由权。所以说你可以有自由去做任何东西，但当你做完那些东西以后你还有没有那个自由权那就不得而知了。

话说回来，很多人都认为这个‘不得参战’规则主要就是要用来救纳吉的。他们想如果没了这条规的话那纳吉有可能会被挑战出局。对我来讲，我认为这规则是为了要救慕尤丁而不是要救纳吉的。

如果说这规则被撤走的话，那有两个情况会发生。第一，慕尤丁会挑战纳吉，他有可能会赢或输。但是你要记住，马来人一般都视挑战你老大是件很无礼的事情，所以他输的机会会大过赢。

第二个情况是没有人挑战纳吉，但可能会有人挑战幕尤丁。如果他输了的话，那纳吉可说是固若金汤，因为纳吉唯一的接班人慕尤丁已经出局了。

这是个他们不愿冒的大险，但与此同时你不能说第一把交椅不能被竞争但第二把交椅则能。这两者都必须同时被公开竞争的，所以对他们来讲更好的选择是两者都不公开。

他们最大的忧虑不是慕尤丁去挑战纳吉（事实上很多人都希望慕尤丁那样做）；如果慕尤丁真的那么做的话那就代表第二把交椅是放空的，所以很多人都能够去抢。

就然我们当慕尤丁去挑战且赢了，那现在纳吉会出局而他就会接手首相一职。这同时也代表大马的副首相一职悬空了，请问你要谁来顶上呢？那三个副主席的其中一人吗？你应该都知道他们是谁吧！

这就是问题的所在，慕尤丁上位的话那副首相会是谁呢？这个问题使那些幕后的‘造王者’都不寒而颤，所以说他们绝不敢冒此大险。

这些人在03年11月老马把职位交给阿都拉（伯拉）时也遇到了同样的问题。在这之前的15个月里他俩就不停地谈判，而其中的一个条件是当伯拉上位后纳吉必须是他的副首相。

问题是，伯拉上位了以后他足足托了两个月还不愿意宣布纳吉是他的副手，直到老马把枪抵在了他的脑袋后纳吉才在04年1月7日宣布就职。

伯拉的心水人物其实是慕尤丁而不是纳吉，纳吉他是老马的人选。老马硬把纳吉往伯拉喉咙塞进去，而伯拉他根本就什么也不能做；老马他一早就对外宣布纳吉是副首相了，虽然说伯拉他一直都没有说话。

所以说，一开始就是老马把纳吉钦点为副首相的，而不是伯拉。伯拉并没有第一时间站出来确定老马的发言，是直到第二天他才那么做的。伯拉他根本就没得选，因为老马已公开地‘感谢’他‘委任’纳吉为副首相了。

这基本上就是伯拉收山的开端；敦马这时就开始了解那15个月的谈判已经变质了。伯拉尔后取消了多个计划，如弯桥，双轨列车等等，这更把老马给惹毛了。

压垮骆驼的最后一根稻草终于在04年9月2日发生了。就在安华被释放的数个小时后，伯拉的女婿，凯利，在通过当时公正党青年团长伊占Ezam Mohd Nor的安排下漏夜前往安华住所，偷偷摸摸地绕过厨房和安华会面。

当我得知这一次的秘密会面后我第一时间把它写在MT上，第二天早上真的是平地一声雷，所有的巫统人都要伯拉做出解释。伯拉当时给出的解释是凯利只是把国际护照拿给安华而已。

凯利当时根本就不是内政部长或移民局的人，为什么会需要他把护照拿给安华呢？虽然如此，巫统还是姑且接受了伯拉的解释，即使那个理由是这么的牵强；直到第二天，星报刊登了一张照片，照片中显示着安华他亲身前往移民办公室领取他自己的护照。

伯拉他的谎言被星报拆穿了，凯利根本就不是什么拿护照给安华。那凯利的目的又是什么呢？

谜底最终被揭开了，伯拉的目的是要通过凯利和安华开会来讨论安华回归巫统的事情。伯拉知道老马追他追得很紧，他以为如果他和回巢的安华联手的话那这是个很不错的策略。

伯拉他亲口承认他们之间的确是进行了谈判。无论如何，在巫统的强烈抗议下，伯拉被迫放弃这个计划-----安华过后成为了公正党的实权主席，然后再在他出狱的四年后成为了国会的反对党主席。

这就是为什么（根据报导）纳吉要（通过伯拉的牵线下）在印尼和安华会面的原因（他们都否认了这些报导）？纳吉他可知道当他去寻求安华的合作来对抗老马时，他的死期其实已近了？

好的，今天到此为止，以上的问题下期自有分解，敬请期待。

And that is the parody of these people. They give a different public image from what they really are. For example both Dr Mahathir and Anwar are republicans and anti-Monarchy. In private and during closed-door meetings they will whack the Monarchy. Publicly, they will whack those who whack the Monarchy.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

I personally know Ibrahim Ali of Perkasa. In fact, I used to be quite close to him when I was still back in Malaysia and from 2006 to 2008 I worked with him and a few of the Umno plus opposition Bloggers to organise Bersih (1.0) plus to organise various events for Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad in our bid to oust Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Pak Lah).

Of course, the game plan was to oust Pak Lah so that Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (Ku Li) could take over. A few meetings were held with Ku Li. In one of these meetings Rafizi Ramli, Haris Ibrahim, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, etc., also attended followed by a buka puasa after that. There were also a few meeting between Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Ku Li to discuss the succession plan.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to get two personalities with huge egos to come to an agreement and to ‘meet in the middle’. When both sides take a very stubborn ‘either my way or no way’ stand, the ‘alliance’ is doomed to fail even as it idles on the runaway. Hence Ku Li was finally bypassed in favour of Najib Tun Razak.

One day Ku Li called us to his office to inform us that the deal was off. He and Dr Mahathir could not come to an agreement so the ‘Old Man’ was going to support Najib instead. That is it, said Ku Li. Finished!

However, we were not quite finished with the issue. We felt that between Ku Li and Najib, although both may not be perfect, Ku Li was certainly the lesser of the two evils. And do we not always talk about the lesser of the two evils when comparing Barisan Nasional to Pakatan Rakyat?

We had to ‘disqualify’ Najib, one way or anther. And one way would be to try to link Najib directly or indirectly to the murder of Altantuya Shaariibuu. Pak Lah’s downfall was his son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin. Hence the reason for the series of articles called ‘The Khairy Chronicles’ that we ran from 2005 to 2006.

In Najib’s case, his wife, Rosmah Mansor, has to be his ‘Khairy’. So we embarked upon a ‘destroy Rosmah’ campaign -- my June 2008 Statutory Declaration being one of those ‘shots’ that we fired.

Nevertheless, in spite of all the shots we fired against Rosmah, Najib still took over and Ku Li was left out in the cold -- partly Ku Li’s own fault for not ‘playing ball’. One fundamental issue was that Ku Li refused to accept Dr Mahathir as the ‘Minister Mentor’, just like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, if he were to take over from Pak Lah.

I mean you do not tell Dr Mahathir to go screw himself and still become the Prime Minister of Malaysia. Ku Li should have agreed to everything that Dr Mahathir wanted and then do a U-turn later -- like what Pak Lah did when he took over from the ‘Old Man’ on 1st November 2003.

But Ku Li is not like that. He is a gentleman and his word is his bond. So he did not want to smile and say yes to Dr Mahathir and then do a U-turn and screw the ‘Old Man’ once he takes over. I would probably have done what Pak Lah did -- say yes first and then, after taking over, shaft the ‘Old Man’ good and proper.

Anyway, back to Ibrahim Ali. We would meet in his office at the Grand Seasons Hotel in Kuala Lumpur every couple of days to plot and plan Pak Lah’s downfall. And one problem with this was that Ibrahim Ali was never punctual. When we arrived at this office he would be in a meeting with this or that Chinese businessman so we had to wait one or two hours to meet him.

But that did not matter because Ibrahim Ali was an excellent host and we would eat and drink to our heart’s delight at the restaurant in the hotel; free-of-charge, of course. Hence that took care of lunch.

The point I am making is that Ibrahim Ali was always in a meeting with Chinese businessmen. Hence Ibrahim Ali is no racist. He is very much Chinese-friendly, a real contradiction of sorts. This ‘racist’ Ibrahim Ali image that he is intentionally creating is merely a show to be 'politically correct'. It is a ‘badge’ he wears to garner the support of the Malay nationalists or Malay ‘extremists’.

It is just like Anwar Ibrahim and his 'Muslim fundamentalist’ image. Anwar is no fundamentalist. He is actually very close to the American Neocons. Anwar is as fundamentalist as Ibrahim Ali is Malay-centric. In fact, Dr Mahathir too is no racist. When he was Prime Minister, one of the grouses that we had with him is that he made too many Chinese and Indians rich. Dr Mahathir, too, is currently playing the race card for a very specific reason (which we will talk about later).

And that is the parody of these people. They give a different public image from what they really are. For example both Dr Mahathir and Anwar are republicans and anti-Monarchy. In private and during closed-door meetings they will whack the Monarchy. Publicly, they will whack those who whack the Monarchy.

On more than one occasion I have personally heard both Dr Mahathir and Anwar say unflattering things about the Rulers. Dr Mahathir once said something unflattering about the Royalty in front of me (he forget I was there) and then turned to look at me and said, “Present company exempted.”

I remember back in 1965 (I was in form three then) when our teacher lectured us about the evils of smoking. We looked at the cigarette box in his shirt pocket and sniggered. Realising what we were sniggering about, he said, “You must do what I say, not do what I do.”

I suppose the same goes for these people. It is what they do that we must focus on, not what they say. What they say is merely for the benefit of a certain audience. Behind the scenes what they do is the reverse of what they say. So why are Dr Mahathir and Ibrahim Ali playing the race card when behind the scene they are doing deals with the Chinese, left, right and centre?

Ah, that is a story for part two of this series. So stay tuned because something very interesting is going on behind the scenes. 

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政治上是正確的

這就是這些人的‘矛盾面具’。他們給大衆的形象和他們自己本身的人品是大不同的。給你個例子，敦馬和安華倆都是共和主義者和很反對皇室制的。在閉門會議裏他們都會干屌皇室，但一旦出現在公開場合他們就會干屌那些干屌皇室的人。

我本身是認識土權會的伊不拉欣Ibrahim Ali的。事實上，儅我還身在馬來西亞時我跟他還走得很近呢，而在06年-08年間我和他還有其他巫統會員曾聚一起策劃Bersih1.0，我們也曾經幫敦馬出籌畫略來推翻前首相阿都拉。

當然，當時的計劃是把阿都拉拉下馬以便能將東姑拉扎利捧上位。我們和東姑開了不少會議，其中一個是在開齋后的，而Rafizi Ramli, Haris Ibrahim, Malik Imtiaz Sarwar等人也有出席。敦馬也出席了當中的幾個會議來討論接班人的事情。

很不幸的，要這兩個高傲的人做出妥協來達到目的是很難的。儅雙方都開出‘只有照著我的方法做’時這個‘聯盟’在還沒開始前就已結束了。所以東姑拉扎利開始被冷落而納吉則開始‘受寵’。

直到有一天東姑拉扎利把我們叫進他的辦公室裏，告訴我們談判已破裂了。他和敦馬無法達成共識，所以那‘老人’決定支持納吉。情況就是這樣，東姑拉扎利說。沒戲唱了！

無論如何，我們覺得此事還沒完呢。我們覺得，雖然說這兩人都不是完美的，但比起納吉東姑拉扎利是個較不爛的蘋果。我們不是一直講説民聯比起囯陣來比較不爛嗎？

我們必須‘取消’納吉的‘資格’。其中一個可行的方法就是把納吉和阿丹杜雅的死間接或直接地扯上關係。我們要阿都拉因他的女婿凱利而倒臺，所以我們在2005年-2006年間寫了一系列稱爲‘凱利的記錄史The Khairy Chronicles’的文章。

對納吉來講，他的老婆，儸斯瑪，必須是他的‘凱利’。所以我們開始了‘消滅儸斯瑪’這個戰略----我08年6月的法定宣誓書就是其中一發子彈。

無論如何，在我們朝儸斯瑪開了許多槍以後，納吉還是上位了----這很多都要怪東姑拉扎利，因爲他不懂得‘順著其他人來’。他最大的敗點是他拒絕在他儅首相后委任敦馬成爲‘指導部長’，就像新加坡的李光耀被委任為內閣資政般。

我的意思是，沒有人能夠告訴敦馬‘去吃自己’然後還能成爲首相的。東姑拉扎利應該先答應那些敦馬所想要的，然後再來個大U-轉----就像是阿都拉在03年11月的做法般。

但東姑拉扎利並沒有那麽做。他是個君子，他對他的諾言看的很重。他不想笑著臉對老馬說‘是’然後在事後來個U-轉再把老馬給幹掉。我想如果是我的話我應該會像阿都拉一樣吧----先答應，然後上位了以後再好好地來收拾這個老人。

好了，話説回來，我當時和伊不拉欣每隔幾天就會在他位于吉隆坡四季酒店的辦公室見面商討要阿都拉倒臺的計劃。他最大的毛病就是不守時，儅我們到達他的辦公室后他會還在和他的華裔生意夥伴開會，我們往往一等就是一兩個小時。

但這對我們來講並不是問題，伊不拉欣他是個很好的主人，我們能夠在他的地方任吃任喝。所以一般上我們的午餐都是在那解決的。

我要講的重點是和他開會的一直都是華人們。所以說伊不拉欣他並不是一個種族主義者，相反地，他對華人熱情得很。‘種族主義’是他特意製造出來的形象，目的是要自己看起來更爲‘政治上是正確的’。這是他用來收取馬來民族主義者或馬來極端主義者的支持的‘徽章’。

這和安華的‘穆斯林基本主義者’的形象是同出一辙的。安華他根本就不是什麽基本主義者，相反地，他跟美國的新保守主義團體走得很近呢。安華的基本主義就和伊不拉欣的種族主義一樣。事實上，敦馬他也不是什麽種族主義者，我們對他的其中一個不滿就是他把太多華人和印度人給養富了。敦馬他現在也因某种原因而打出種族主義這張牌（我們以後會更加一步地細談）。

這就是這些人的‘矛盾面具’。他們給大衆的形象和他們自己本身的人品是大不同的。給你個例子，敦馬和安華倆都是共和主義者和很反對皇室制的。在閉門會議裏他們都會干屌皇室，但一旦出現在公開場合他們就會干屌那些干屌皇室的人。

我在不止一個場合裏親耳聽到敦馬和安華對皇室大談不是。敦馬曾經在我的面前（他忘了我有在場）大談皇室的不是，然後再轉身對我說,‘（以上言論）不包括在場的人’。

我還記得在1965年（我還是個中三學生）有一位老師向我們闡述吸煙的壞處。我們對著放在他口袋裏的香煙盒咧嘴而笑。他知道了我們笑的是什麽以後，他就說：“你們必須做我講的，而不是做我做的。”

我想這可以用來形容以上這些人吧。我們必須把注意力放在他們所做的事情上，而不是他們所說的事情。他們所說的只是要特定的聽衆聼得舒服而已，他們在後面所做的一切往往都是和他們所說相反的。所以說，正當敦馬和伊不拉欣一直都和華人有往來時，爲什麽他們還要大打種族主義這張牌呢？

對了，這只是兩篇文章的第一篇而已，所以敬請期待下一篇更爲精彩的文章來繼續為你揭露政治的内幕。

Hence DAP and PAS did not do too badly in the votes versus seats comparison. It is PKR’s performance that upset these figures. And this is because DAP contested in the predominantly Chinese areas and PAS in the predominantly Malay areas while PKR contested in the ‘mixed’ areas. Hence Pakatan Rakyat’s performance in the mixed areas was not that good, thus bringing down Pakatan Rakyat’s performance.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

However in a show of unlimited stupidity, BN’s cybertroopers argue that BN has got more popular votes than either DAP, PKR or PAS based on an individual party basis. Their contention is that the opposition’s popular votes have to be pegged to the individual parties and not Pakatan Rakyat as a whole because Pakatan is not a registered entity with the Registrar Of Societies (ROS).

Of course Pakatan is not a registered entity. We do not need to be Sherlock Holmes to deduce who is the one blocking Pakatan from getting registered as a single coalition.

In the realm of social media especially in Facebook, those who are pro-Pakatan have shot down the arguments of the BN cybertroopers with comments such as “Have you taken your daily dose of medicine?” or “Janganlah bergaya sangat nak tunjukkan kebodohan awak tu.”

Although BN has won more seats than Pakatan, the fact that they have lost the popular vote must be gnawing at their gut. And this makes them come up with nonsensical and irrational arguments beyond the realm of logic.

Simply put, BN won due to the votes of ignorant voters and due to seat-shenanigans (rural areas having less voters but given more seats). Therefore they are now trying to “recapture” the popular vote via some spin in order to regain some sort of credibility. Nonetheless it is a futile attempt. -- (Selena Tay)

READ MORE HERE: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/06/15/bns-stupid-moves/

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That was what Selena Tay wrote today in Free Malaysia Today. And since Selena is a DAP activist and supporter it is quite natural that she wrote the way she did although you may be of the opinion that what she wrote is very biased and one-sided. Nevertheless, to accuse her of lying or of distorting facts would not be accurate or fair because she is merely expressing what she believes to be the truth. And the truth comes in many shapes, sizes and colours.

For example, a staunch and committed Muslim who writes or gives his/her opinion on Islam would say that Islam is the true religion (while all other religions are false) and that the only way you are going to get into heaven is to follow Prophet Muhammad and believe in the Qur’an, Hadith and Sunnah because on Judgment Day only the followers of Muhammad will enter heaven.

On the other hand, a staunch and committed Christian who writes or gives his/her opinion on Christianity would say that Christianity is the true religion (while all other religions are false) and that the only way you are going to get into heaven is to follow Jesus Christ and believe in the Trinity and the Bible because on Judgment Day only the followers of Jesus will enter heaven.

Now, both these people (the Muslim and the Christian) believe what they say to be the truth and would stake their soul on it (which is actually what is happening anyway). They are not lying. They never intended to tell even one iota of a lie. They would swear on their life that what they say is God’s truth.

But then how can both be telling the truth when what they say contradicts each other? There can only be one truth while the other has to be a lie. Or can both actually be lies?

Well, that depends on what you believe. If you are a Muslim then you will say the Muslim chap is telling the truth while the Christian chap is lying whereas if you are a Christian you will say that the Christian chap is telling the truth while the Muslim chap is lying. And if you are a Jew you will say both the Muslim and Christian chaps are lying. Both statements are lies.

So you see, truth is very subjective and true and false depends on your belief system. A lie can be the truth and the truth can be a lie depending on what you believe. And belief is very powerful. Belief needs not be about facts or about the truth. It is about what you think is true or what you imagine is the truth. And that, basically, would be how you need to assess what Selena wrote above.

The point I am trying to make is you need to look at the graphics below, which was published today in another DAP leader’s Blog (Sakmongkol AK47). Selena is suggesting that Barisan Nasional garnered lesser votes than Pakatan Rakyat and therefore is not the legitimate government although it won more seats than Pakatan Rakyat (133 versus 89).

Of course, this is what she believes and we cannot fault her for what she believes since she is a DAP activist. Those who are on the ‘other side’ or who are neutral may not see it this way since Malaysia has adopted the British Westminster system of first-pass-the-post, which means majority seats and not majority votes gives you the government (and which has already been explained many times but which has fallen on deaf ears).

Now, is this so strange or weird? Well, look at the graphics below. DAP won 15.71% of the votes and 17.12% of the seats (not too bad in the votes versus seats balance). PAS, however, won almost the same number of votes (14.77%, which is 0.94% less than DAP) and yet it won only 9.46% of the seats (which is 7.66% less than DAP).

So, PAS won 0.94% votes less than DAP but it won 7.66% seats less than DAP. Would Selena regard this as fair or unfair? She did not offer any comment, of course.

PKR, on the other hand, won the highest number of votes (20.39%). Yet it won only 13.5% of the seats (which is lower than DAP but with more votes than DAP). Would Selena regard this as fair or unfair? She did not offer any comment, of course.

Okay, let us look at just DAP and PAS. Combined, they won 30.48% of the votes but they won only 26.58% of the seats. That is actually not too bad and almost balances in the votes versus seats analaysis. It is only when you add PKR’s performance that the combined figures (of all three) becomes 50.88% of the votes and merely 40.09% of the seats.

Hence DAP and PAS did not do too badly in the votes versus seats comparison. It is PKR’s performance that upset these figures. And this is because DAP contested in the predominantly Chinese areas and PAS in the predominantly Malay areas while PKR contested in the ‘mixed’ areas. Hence Pakatan Rakyat’s performance in the mixed areas was not that good, thus bringing down Pakatan Rakyat’s performance.

Hence the problem is not Pakatan Rakyat per se. Pakatan Rakyat -- if only DAP and PAS were taken into consideration -- actually performed quite okay in the votes versus seats analysis. It is only when you add PKR to it that the votes versus seats performance looks miserable.

Let’s look at another example. Umno, DAP and PAS combined won 59.8% of the votes and 66.22% of the seats. Then, Umno, PKR and PAS combined won 64.48% of the votes and 62.25% of the seats.

Can you see how the votes go up and the seats go down, and vice versa, when you change the ‘mix’?

Let me paint a new scenario. Say, PKR joins Barisan Nasional. What will we now see? The ‘new’ Barisan Nasional with PKR as a member would have won 67.79% of the votes (more than two-thirds of the votes) and 73.4% of the seats.

Okay, yet another scenario. Say, Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat both break up and Umno and PAS, for the sake of Malay-Muslim unity, form a unity government. Umno and PAS combined would have won 44.09% of the votes and 49.1% of the seats. And this would mean the Malay-Muslim unity government would now be kicked out unless some Malays from PKR cross over to join Umno-PAS.

And if the ‘others’ do not pass a vote of no confidence against Umno-PAS in Parliament (because they cannot come to a consensus) then Umno-PAS would rule with only 49.1% of the seats. Now that is what we would call a ‘minority government’ -- a term that is being wrongly used to describe the current Barisan Nasional government that has 59.9% of the seats in Parliament.

Interesting is it not? And what is even more interesting is if Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat both break up and Umno and DAP form a unity government then they would have won 45.03% of the votes and yet they would win 56.76% of the seats (which means they would still rule with even lesser votes than the current Barisan Nasional).

Hence Barisan Nasional, in its present form, only has 47.4% of the votes and 59.9% of the seats while a new coalition of just Umno and DAP would be not that far off with 45.03% of the votes and yet they would win 56.76% of the seats.

In short, the real winners in the votes versus seats contest are Umno and DAP. The rest from both sides of the political divide are merely making up the numbers. A coalition of Umno and DAP can actually control the country between just the both of them. They do not need the rest.

Hmm…if Umno were to agree with what DAP wants and both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat were to disband then Umno and DAP can take Malaysia forward without the need of the rest of the ‘small players’.

That, of course, is never going to happen for very obvious reasons -- which is Umno and DAP are on the reverse side of the same extremist and uncompromising coin. But then, putting personal party interest aside and for the sake of a better Malaysia, that may not be such a bad idea after all although there is no way in hell this can happen.

Selena needs to look at the fine details in analysing the real scenario. The issue of lesser votes and more seats or more votes and lesser seats cuts across both Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat. To say that Barisan Nasional won less votes and more seats (or vice versa) while ignoring the fact that the same thing also happened in Pakatan Rakyat is not a balanced analysis.

And another unfair statement from Selena is: “Of course Pakatan is not a registered entity. We do not need to be Sherlock Holmes to deduce who is the one blocking Pakatan from getting registered as a single coalition.”

Has Pakatan Rakyat submitted its registration application? When was that and why has it not been approved yet? I do not have the details but since Selena brought it up then she should offer some details to support this allegation. And she had better get used to the fact that in the first-pass-the-post system you form the government based on majority seats and not majority votes. To argue otherwise is not only dishonest but demonstrates ignorance as well.

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讓我們再來詳細地看看

所以說行動黨和伊斯蘭黨在選票對席位的比例上交出了不錯的成績，只是公正黨的表現把這些數目給搞難看了。這是因爲行動黨/伊斯蘭黨一般都在華人區/馬來人區參選，而公正黨則在混合區參選。故此可看出民聯在混合區的表現其實是不大理想的，所以直接地拖垮了總體表現。

以上就是Selena Tay在FMT發表的文章。因爲她是個行動黨的鉄粉所以她文章的寫法是如此的。你可能會認爲她的寫法很不中立和偏袒某方，但如果你要指責她扭曲事實那是對她來講是很不公平的，因爲她只是寫出她認爲是事實的看法而已；而事實是有很多不同類型的 。

打個比方，對一個虔誠的回教徒來講，儅別人問起他對宗教的看法時，他會講回教是唯一正確的宗教（其他宗教都是假的），而你唯一能上天堂的方法就是追隨先知默罕默德和相信古蘭經和其他回教聖經，因爲在世界末日那一天只有先知的追隨者能夠上天堂。

另一方面，一個虔誠的基督徒則會說基督教是唯一正確的宗教（其他宗教都是假的），而你唯一能上天堂的方法就是追隨耶穌基督和相信聖經，因爲在世界末日那一天只有耶穌的追隨者能夠上天堂。

好了，這兩個人都相信他們講的都是事實而願意以他們的靈魂來宣誓（這一切其實在現實世界裏都正在發生著）。他們都沒有撒謊，他們就連要吐出一字謊言的意念也沒有。他們回憶他們的生命來發誓他們所講的一切都是上帝的真言。

但他們兩怎能同時閒說真話而又彼此矛盾對方呢？那只能存在一個真理而另一個必須是謊言。抑或這兩都在説謊？

這真的很視乎你相信的到底是什麽。如果你是個回教徒你會講那個回教徒講的是真話而那個基督徒正撒謊，如果你是個基督徒則反之。而如果你是個猶太人的話你就會講他們兩都在説謊。

所以你看，真理其實是很主觀的而對錯全視乎你的信仰。一個謊言可以是真理和反之，全都視乎你到底在相信些什麽。信仰是很有威力的，它不在乎事實或真理。它在乎的是你認爲什麽是真的或你設想的真理是什麽樣子的。這基本上就是你必須用來理解Selena這篇文章的工具。

我要講的重點是，你必須去看看上方由另一行動黨領袖(Sakmongkol AK47)所發表的圖表。Selena認爲既然囯陣的得票比民聯來得少那它們就是非法的政府，即使他們贏得更多的囯席位（133對89）。

這是她相信的東西，我們不能因她相信的東西來怪罪她。那些中立的和敵對的可能會不認同她的看法，因爲馬來西亞採取的是英國西敏寺的席位制選舉，意即多席位（而不是多選票）才能讓你執政中央（我已經多遍解釋這一點了，但有些人卻聼不進耳裏）。

好了，那現在這真的很奇怪嗎？讓我們來看看以上圖表。行動黨贏得了15.71%的選票來奪得17.12%的席位數（這是個很不錯的選票換席位比例）。另一方面，伊斯蘭黨贏得了接近一樣的選票（14.77%，比行動黨少0.94%）但他們只奪得9.46%的席位（比行動黨少7.66%）。

所以，伊斯蘭黨只比行動黨少贏0.94%選票但他們的席位竟少了7.66%。這對Selena來講公平不？當然，她並沒有對此發表看法。

再看看公正黨，他們贏得了最高的選票（20.39%），但只奪得13.5%的席位，這是比行動黨還低呢。這對Selena來講公平不？當然，她並沒有對此發表看法。

好，讓我們來看看儅行動黨和伊斯蘭黨和起來后是怎樣一個情形。他們會以30.48%的選票奪得26.58%的席位。這個比例基本上還是不錯的，但一旦你加進公正黨的表現，民聯三黨的表現就變成50.88%的選票對40.09%的席位。

所以說行動黨和伊斯蘭黨在選票對席位的比例上交出了不錯的成績，只是公正黨的表現把這些數目給搞難看了。這是因爲行動黨/伊斯蘭黨一般都在華人區/馬來人區參選，而公正黨則在混合區參選。故此可看出民聯在混合區的表現其實是不大理想的，所以拖垮了總體的表現。

這其實並不是民聯的問題；如果我們只看行動黨和伊斯蘭黨的話，他們的選票對席位的比例其實是還不錯的。一旦你放進公正黨的成績以後，民聯的成績才變得很難看。

換個例子來看看，巫統，行動黨和伊斯蘭黨三者的縂選票是59.8%和66.22%席位。巫統，公正黨和伊斯蘭黨三者的縂選票則是64.48%和62.25%席位。

你看到了嗎？選票對席位比例是會隨著你的‘組合’而上升下降的。

讓我來給你另一個例子，就講説公正黨加入囯陣好了，那‘新囯陣’的票數就會變成67.79%（多過2/3）而席位則是73.4%。

再給你另一個例子，就講説囯陣和民聯兩紛紛拆夥好了，然後爲了能夠把馬來穆斯林給團結起來，巫統和伊斯蘭黨結盟。那他們兩只會以44.09%的選票奪得49.1%的席位。這也表示馬來穆斯林政府是不能成立的，除非公正黨的一些馬來議院跳槽來加入他們。

如果‘其他人’因某個因素而沒有對巫統-伊斯蘭黨投不信任票的話，那巫統-伊斯蘭黨就能以49.1%的不過半席位組織政府。現在我們就能把他們稱之爲‘少數政府minority government’了----這個詞一直被錯誤地用來形容現在的囯陣，因爲囯陣他們並不是少數政府，他們擁有59.9%的席位。

很有趣，不是嗎？更爲有趣的是，如果巫統與行動黨結盟，那他們就會以45.03%的選票奪得56.76%的席位（亦即他們可以比目前囯陣還要少的選票直接執政）。

所以說，現今的囯陣是以47.4%的選票贏得59.9%席位，但巫統-行動黨也差不遠，他們只需以45.03%的選票就能以56.76%席位執政。

簡短一點來講，選票換席位的真正贏者是巫統和行動黨；其他的政黨只是把他們的數目整合起來而已。巫統與行動黨的聯盟已足以執政了，他們並不需其他的政黨。

哼。。。如果巫統能夠答應行動黨的要求和囯陣和民聯兩紛紛拆夥，那巫統和行動黨就能自行結盟來執政而不需要去鳥其他的‘小黨’了。

這當然是不可能發生的，巫統和行動黨都身処很極端的對抗兩端。當然，如果他們兩能爲了馬來西亞的未來而放下己黨的利益的話，那結盟未嘗不是件好事。但這是一百萬年也不會發生的事情。

Selena必須更詳細地去分析這些細節。那些所謂的少票換多席位其實也都發生在民聯身上的。如果只注重于囯陣是以少票換多席位而忽略掉民聯本身也發生同樣的事情，這其實不是個很公平和全面的分析。

Selena發表的另一個不公平看法是：“民聯當然不是一個已正式註冊的聯盟。我們不用福爾摩斯的推理也能知道，背後有人一直在搞破壞，他們不要民聯被註冊為一個政治聯盟。”

民聯已經呈交註冊申請書了嗎？他們是幾時呈交的？爲何還沒被批准呢？我並沒有這些細節，但既然Selena她提起的話她就應該給出些細節來支撐她的指責。她也最好能早日了解我國的選舉系統是以多席位執政的，而不是多選票。持續的反駁這一點不止顯示出你是不誠實的，它也顯示出你是無知的。

Malaysia cannot depend on just one source of income -- Petronas. But then even Malaysians (Chinese in particular, but Indians and Malays as well) are moving their money to other countries (and not all is ‘dirty’ money but are legitimate investments). Some are even coming to the UK and billions are being invested here (some of them are my personal friends). How long can this go on before something breaks?

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

TV show host attacked and robbed by armed gang

A TV cooking show host was attacked and robbed by a group of men armed with sticks outside a condominium near Tropicana here.

Lim Wei Tiong, 27, who works with Astro, was attacked when he was about to visit a friend at a condominium along Jalan Tropicana Utama on Monday night.

He and a friend had gone separately to a mutual friend’s place at about 11pm when the incident occurred.

“It all happened so fast. One minute I had parked my car and got out, the next minute I was surrounded by a group of motorcyclists armed with sticks,” he said at the University Malaya Medical Centre (UMMC) yesterday.

Lim said the men hit him on the head and grabbed his bag containing his wallet and handphone.

“I fell to the ground but they just continued hitting me,” he said, adding that his friend who witnessed the incident was too scared to come to his aid.

Lim said the next thing he remembered was being in an ambulance. He suffered a broken arm and lacerations to the head.

“Luckily, the robbers didn’t take my car keys,” he said.

Last October, an Astro Awani newscaster was attacked and robbed when she was being driven home by her husband.

As they got out of the car, three men on motorcycles approached them, one armed with a grass cutter.

A brief scuffle ensued when one of the robbers opened the front passenger door, but they snatched her bag and fled.

The husband gave chase for about 4km before ramming into the suspects’ motorcycle near the Maluri Complex. Two of the suspects were caught while one managed to escape.

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Since the results of the 5th May 2013 general election was announced about five weeks ago there has been a lot of brouhaha as to whether the election was free and fair (or fraudulent), who should be the Prime Minister (and whether Najib Tun Razak is about to be ousted), whether racism in Malaysia is currently as bad or worse than it was in 1969 (the result of many irresponsible statements being indiscriminately and blatantly issued), whether the Malays are now disunited and split (compared to the Chinese, 97% of them who voted en bloc), and so on.

I suppose there is enough chatter in the media so I really do not need to add to the noise, already deafening as it is. So today I want to talk about what every man and his dog is not talking about. And that subject is very basic, about quality of life.

Now, I am not saying that the other subjects are not important. What I am saying is so many people are already talking about those subjects so I would like to talk about what no one appears to be concerned about: the quality of life in Malaysia.

Elections are about choosing a government. Hence elections are part of democracy or about choosing a democratically elected government. But choosing a government is not the whole of democracy. Choosing a government is one of the aspects of democracy. That is what the shouters and screamers appear to miss.

Choosing a government is not the end game. Choosing a government is not the final destination. It is merely the beginning of a journey. Once we have chosen the government, then this government must work towards and guarantee us quality of life.

Malaysia appears to have serious security problems, both external and internal. Recently Malaysia got a new IGP and DIGP and today we got a new army chief. Are we going to see new brooms sweeping clean or is it going to be same old same old? 

Malaysia is no longer a safe place. Hence while Malaysians demonstrate on the streets and protest the 5th May 2013 general election and file election petitions in court, is anyone addressing the security issue? Will our family now be safer on the streets and in our homes or is crime going to get worse? The reports we are receiving is that Malaysia is getting to be a dangerous place to live.

Then we are arguing about vernacular schools and mother-tongue education and racial quotas in institutions of higher learning. It is all about race. But are we also arguing about the quality of Malaysia’s education? Are we mainly churning out quantity but sacrificing quality? Is Malaysia a degree mill that merely focuses on numbers? Can Malaysia’s graduates (in particular the Malay graduates) compete internationally?

The focus appears to be regarding race, quotas and numbers but not in the quality of the product.

Then we come to my favourite subject, health. And at my age that is finally what is of concern to me personally. Why do we have so many qualified doctors serving outside Malaysia (in particular non-Malay Malaysians but many Malays as well)? Some of the doctors I spoke to expressed a desire to return to Malaysia even though they are currently paid four or five times what they could earn back in Malaysia.

The problem for these people, though, in particular the non-Malays, is that they have no career prospects back in Malaysia because of the colour of their skin. Less capable and less qualified Malays are promoted above the heads of the non-Malays. Hence we have a serious brain drain in the medical profession and because of that our healthcare system has to suffer.

Security, education, health -- just three of the so many crucial issues. But we do not appear to be concerned about these matters. We appear more concerned about why Pakatan Rakyat, which garnered 51% of the popular votes, is not the government although Malaysia practices the first-past-the-post Westminster system of Parliament. Even if Najib concedes defeat and makes way for Anwar Ibrahim to take over as Prime Minister will all these issues be automatically resolved?

Was not Anwar Ibrahim once the Education Minister and Chua Jui Meng once the Health Minister? If they could not improve the situation when they once had the chance to do something about it what assurance do we have that they can do it now? And have they told us in great detail how they are going to do it if they do come into power? It appears like they are as clueless now as they were when they were in charge of those Ministries.

I was once a central committee member of the Malay Chamber of Commerce and, invariably, interacted with the various Ministries such as Trade and Finance. I ‘served’ through quite a number of Ministers and was fortunate enough to have sat in many meetings with the government to attempt to resolve many issues.

Of course, I was a businessman then and had dealings with companies and businessmen from all over the world. And I must say that this opened my eyes to many things and allowed me to understand what makes these people tick.

Malaysia was initially a favourites destination for foreign investors. And the reason for this, first of all, was because Malaysia had cheap labour compared to, say, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.

Eventually, Malaysia no longer could provide cheap labour and we received instructions from the Trade Minister to no longer promote Malaysia as having cheap labour (because we were no longer cheap) but instead to promote Malaysia as having skilled labour. And that was why the government gave a lot of incentives and provided a lot of funds for training (so that our cheap labour could be converted to skilled labour).

The other attraction was that Malaysians spoke good English whereas most of our ASEAN neighbours did not. This made it easier for the foreigners to communicate with us.

The third factor was that Malaysia was more stable politically compared to our ASEAN neighbours and Malaysia was a safer place than the other countries.

Finally, for the Japanese in particular, is that Malaysia had plenty of golf courses and a ‘vibrant’ nightlife.

All these gave Malaysia an advantage over Singapore (expensive), Thailand (English no good), Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines (politically unstable), and so on.

Today, Malaysia is way at the bottom of the list of favourites with Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines above us. Maybe Burma will soon be above Malaysia as well -- which will really be adding insult to injury.

Malaysia cannot depend on just one source of income -- Petronas. But then even Malaysians (Chinese in particular, but Indians and Malays as well) are moving their money to other countries (and not all is ‘dirty’ money but are legitimate investments). Some are even coming to the UK and billions are being invested here (some of them are my personal friends). How long can this go on before something breaks?

Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that Malaysia is a country with first-world infrastructure but third-world mentality. Soon Malaysia is going to be a country with third-world infrastructure and third-world mentality. Some European ‘powers’, the UK included, are already moving in that direction. Do you think a puny nation like Malaysia can be spared that same fate?

Malaysia already does not have quality of life in spite of our ‘booming’ economy. What do you think the quality of life is going to be like once Malaysia becomes like Greece? And why do you think people like me prefer to set up a kopitiam in the North-West of England rather than in the North-West of Malaysia (apart from the fact that I live in Manchester)?

So you people can continue to scream about GE13 and Blackout 505 and whatnot. I am not saying you should not do that. But while you do that I am going to scream about quality of life plus security, education, healthcare and Malaysia’s competitiveness as a foreign investor destination, which neither Najib nor Anwar are talking about.

                                        ****************************************

回到最基本：生活素质

马来西亚不能单靠国油这个经济来源。但现在的情况是很多马来西亚人（特别是华人，当然马来人和印度人也有）都把他们的钱（不全都是黑钱，有些是很正当地赚来的）转往国外。他们有些人还带了上亿元来到英国投资（当中有些人是我的朋友）。请问这种情况能够持续多久？

电视节目主持人被持械抢匪攻击和打劫

一名电视节目主持人在Tropicana附近的一所公寓被一帮手持木棍的抢匪攻击和打劫

（下文省略）

****************************************

自从5月5大选结果出炉以后坊间就不断地传出质疑声：大选是否公正无舞弊，谁应该成为首相（还有纳吉是否会被拉下马），现今马来西亚的种族歧视是否比起在1969年变得更严重，马来人现在到底是团结的还是分散的（比起97%的华人们都一致投给反对党）等等。

我想知些课题都被媒体渲染得‘全民皆吵’了，我在此不必再往此处增添杂音。所以我今天要讲的是一个所有人和他们的看门狗都没有触及的简单课题，那就是生活素质。

当然我不是讲说其他课题都是不重要的。我的意思是，既然其他人都有在关注其他课题了，那我应该踏出步来讨论他们都没有关注的课题：在马来西亚生活的生活素质。

选举的目的是让我们选出个政府来，它只是民主的一部分而以。所以说选政府并不是民主的全部，它也只是民主的一部分而以。这就使那些噪音制造者所看不清的。

选了政府并不代表我们已经到达目的地了，相反地，这只是民主路程的开头而以。一旦我们选出了一个政府，这个政府就有必要不停地工作来给有我们一个有素质的生活。

马来西亚面临着很多治安问题，不管是国内的还是国际上的。马来西亚最近换了个新的总警长和副总警长，而今天我们也迎来了个新的军队将领。我们会看到的是新扫把来把环境给打扫干净好事其实这只是新瓶装旧酒呢？

马来西亚不再是个安全的地方了。所以当所有人都忙着上街示威和向法庭提出上诉时，有没有人停下来看看我们的治安课题呢？现在我们街上和家里的治安是变好还是变坏了？我们所得到的报告都一致指出马来西亚已变得越来越危险了。

我们争吵的是个源流的母语学校和大学的种族固打制，但有没有人来关心我们的教育素质？我们是否正在以数目来取代素质？马来西亚是否只是一个关注数目的文凭制造地？马来西亚的大学生（特别是马来裔的）能否在国际社会的舞台上与他人竞争呢？

我们的焦点似乎只是在种族，固打与数目上，而不是在素质上。

然后我们还有一个我最注重的课题（这和我的年龄有很大的牵连），那就是医疗。为何我们有很多合格的医生在国外工作呢（特别是非马来人，当然也有很多马来医生）？我和一些医生交谈过，其实他们都很愿意回国服务的，即使他们现在赚的钱是马来西亚医生薪水的4，5倍。

他们的问题是，特别是非马来医生，当他们回马服务后他们会因他们的肤色而在事业上碰到阻滞；那些比较没有资格的马来医生往往会被提拔成为他们的上司。所以这导致了我们的医疗界里出现了严重的人才外流和这对我们的医疗系统已造成了很大的伤害。

治安，教育，医疗，这只是一堆课题的当中三个而以，但我们好像都不大关心它们。我们关心的是为何民联以51%的选票在马来西亚的西敏寺席位选举制里当不了政府。就当纳吉认输而把首相一职献给安华好了，请问这些课题是否就能自动地被解决掉了呢？

安华和蔡锐明不曾经当过教育部长和卫生部长吗？如果当年他们掌权时没有能力去改善这些问题，那请问现在我们有些什么保障来说明他们上位以后就会呢？还有，他们有没有详细地告诉过我们他们上位后要怎样应付这些课题呢？他们现在看起来和当年他们掌权时一样的毫无头绪。

我曾经是马来商会的中央执委，因而我有很多机会和各个部长开会，如贸易部长等。我曾为多任部长‘服务’过，也很有幸的能和他们坐在一起解决不同的问题。

当然，我当时是个商人且和多国不同的公司有生意来往。我的这些经验都令我大开眼界和令我了解这些人到底要的是什么。

马来西亚一开始是国外投资者的最爱。这背后的第一个原因是因为马来西亚的人工相比起日本，台湾，韩国等来得便宜。

后来，马来西亚不再提供低价廉工，而我们也接到贸易部的指令要我们别再以‘廉价’来促销马来西亚。我们必须要把马来西亚的新卖点，那就是技术人力，促销给外国投资者。这就是为什么政府给出了各种不同的津贴与基金来训练国内的员工们（以便我们的廉价人力能够被转换成技术人力）。

我们的另一个卖点就是我们国民的英语会话能力（相比起其他东南亚邻国）。这令那些投资者能更有效和更简单地和我们沟通。

我们的第三个卖点就是我们稳定的政治格局（相比起其他东南亚邻国），马来西亚当时是个很安全的国家。

最后，马来西亚拥有很多的高尔夫球场和蓬勃的夜生活（这对日本人来讲特别重要）。

马来西亚当时靠这几点把邻国如新加坡（高价人工），泰国（英语程度低），柬埔寨，越南，印尼，菲律宾（政治动态）等给比下去了。

今天，马来西亚不再是投资者的最爱了，他们已更偏爱新加坡，泰国，柬埔寨，越南，印尼，菲律宾。或许在将来的不久缅甸也会后来居上，倒时真的是伤口上撒盐了。

马来西亚不能单靠国油这个经济来源。但现在的情况是很多马来西亚人（特别是华人，当然马来人和印度人也有）都把他们的钱（不全都是黑钱，有些是很正当地赚来的）转往国外。他们有些人还带了上亿元来到英国投资（当中有些人是我的朋友）。请问这种情况能够持续多久？

前首相阿都拉曾经说过马来西亚拥有第一流的设备，第三流的思想。很快的马来西亚就会迈向第三流的设备，第三流的思想了。有些欧洲‘大国’，如英国，已经朝这个方向前进了，你想马来西亚这个弹丸小国能逃离这个命运吗？

在经济‘蓬勃’的情况下，马来西亚也未能拥有一个高素质的生活。你想当马来西亚变成另一个希腊是我们的生活会变得怎样？还有你猜想为何我要把咖啡店开在英国西北部开而不是在大马西北部（除了我现在住在曼彻斯特以外）？

你们可以继续的为第13届大选和505的停电大喊大叫，我并没有讲你们不可以那么做。但当你们这么做时，我会为大马的生活素质，治安，教育，医疗，外来投资等大喊大叫；在这些课题上，纳吉和安华都是只字不提的。

The whacking of Najib’s brother is the beginning of an onslaught that we are going to see against Najib. And do not clap and cheer too early. If Najib does fall, and unless someone from Pakatan Rakyat takes over, you may not like the alternative to Najib. You may, not long after that, be reminiscing about the ‘good old days’ when Najib was Prime Minister.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

You should first read this article by Clive Kessler: GE13: What happened? And what now? (Part 1). I find this analysis not only spot on but very interesting by virtue of the fact that I have said the same thing many times prior to the 5th May 2013 general election. And I said this before and not after the general election.

In fact, my two-hour talk in Cambridge earlier this year was about just that: ‘the three Rs’ -- Race, Religion and Royalty. I explained what would happen in the general election, as what Clive Kessler talked about in his article. I said that most of the Chinese would vote opposition while the majority of the Malays would vote government. And this would only make racial politics even worse than it already is.

Another interesting news item is: Najib’s brother accused of undermining Umno by backing AirAsia X CEO. And I find this also interesting because about two years ago I held a closed-door ‘briefing’ for some of the members of Friends of Pakatan Rakyat in London to explain why it may not be in the best interest of the nation to get rid of Najib Tun Razak. (But I will talk more about that later).

I have always considered myself a libertarian. My tutor, however, after three months of me submitting my course work and essays, labelled me a relativist. Can I be a relativist-libertarian? If there is no such classification maybe it is time we invented one. But what does a relativist-libertarian actually mean (if there is such a thing)?

I suppose I could sum it up as meaning someone who looks at things in relation to or in comparison to something else and someone who is liberal enough to defend your right to be different even if I do not agree with your stand.

For example I am a royalist and I believe in the monarchy system (or at least in a constitutional monarchy system) but I respect your right to espouse the virtues of a republic without considering you a traitor or accusing you of sedition. But I do not consider it your right to ask that the monarchs be ousted and be put to death. That is sedition. That is a breach of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and are we not the ones who is asking the government to respect the Constitution?

Another example. I am not a lesbian (hell, I am not even a woman) but I see no wrong if you want to be gay. That is your democratic right and part of your fundamental liberty.

I believe in non-race-base political parties (as opposed to a ‘multi-racial’ party like what most Malaysians talk about -- which is still racial in that sense but only that it is multi-racial) but I believe it is the democratic right of Malaysians to have race-base parties like Umno, MCA and MIC (or religion-base parties like PAS).

Let me put it another way. It is your democratic right to be a racist. No one can and should take this right away from you. For that matter, you can even hate dogs, cats, pigs, or whatever, as well. That, too, is your democratic right. But you do not have the right to utter racial slurs. That is a crime -- as you do not the right to kick or whip dogs, cats or pigs just because you hate them (which is cruelty to animals).

Am I defending racism? No! I am defending your right to be a racist. Is it not a Christian virtue to hate the sin but love the sinner (or something like that)? Hence hate racism but respect the right of someone to be a racist just as long as that person does not utter a racial slur. Only then do we whack them kau-kau.

Does this sound confusing? It should not if you can look at things from more than one perspective.

Anyway, back to the closed-door ‘briefing’ that I gave some of the members of Friends of Pakatan Rakyat in London, which I spoke about earlier. Most people look at things from only one perspective. And this perspective is: should Barisan Nasional or Pakatan Rakyat be the government? Or, should Najib Tun Razak or Anwar Ibrahim be the Prime Minister?

If you look at it from just one perspective this is how you would look at things. BN or PR? Najib or Anwar?

But that is merely ‘Plan A’. Should we not also have a ‘Plan B’ in case ‘Plan A’ fails? This was the gist of my London briefing to Friends of Pakatan Rakyat. ‘Plan A’ is ideal. We should aim for ‘Plan A’. But we should also have a ‘Plan B’ in case.

And ‘Plan B’ here would be in the event that Pakatan Rakyat fails to take over and Barisan Nasional retains the government, then what type of government do we want and who do we want heading that government? And when we talk about Barisan Nasional we are invariably talking about Umno because Umno is going to most likely emerge dominant since the Chinese are expected to swing to the opposition almost en bloc.

Hence, if Pakatan Rakyat cannot take over and Anwar Ibrahim cannot become Prime Minister, then, like it or not, we shall be lumbered with someone from Umno as Prime Minister.

The question is: who from Umno should be the Prime Minister? Najib has baggage, granted, but then who from Umno does not have baggage -- Altantuya Shaariibuu and the Scorpene submarines notwithstanding? As a relativist cum libertarian (or relativist-libertarian) I would, as most Pakatan Rakyat people are fond of saying, look at the lesser of the evils.

Let me put it this way. Barisan Nasional is the government. We have no choice about that. Umno is the dominant partner in the government. We have no choice about that either. But this does not mean Najib must be the Prime Minister. Fortunately, we do have a choice to address that issue (or rather Umno is the one with the choice).

But then what are our priorities? If it is good governance, transparency, accountability, eradication of abuse of power/corruption, and so on, then it does not matter who from Umno becomes Prime Minister because none of that will be achieved under Umno. But if it is to eliminate racism then it will make a difference as to who becomes the Prime Minister.

Okay, back to the news item ‘Najib’s brother accused of undermining Umno by backing AirAsia X CEO’. It is clear that the hawks in Umno want to move more to the right (if I may be permitted to call it that although ‘right’ may not quite be the right classification to use). And Najib is an obstacle to this move (see how they attacked Najib’s brother when he attacked racism). Hence there is going to be a move to oust Najib so that Umno can be more radical and Malay-centric (what I referred to as moving to the right).

Hence, as I said, ideally Pakatan Rakyat should take over. But if that cannot happen and if we have to settle for an Umno-dominated Barisan Nasional for another five years, then it is crucial for the nation (in particular for libertarians like me) that we also become relativists.

Najib is not my best choice. But if we have to settle for Umno then let us have a Prime Minister who is at least attempting to bring Umno from the right to the centre. And a centrist Umno is best for the nation compared to a Malay-centric Umno.

Yes, maybe I am not only a libertarian and relativist. Maybe I am a pragmatist as well. I suppose that is why the Malays preferred the British Colonialists instead of the Japanese Colonialists. Merdeka is better. But if we needed to be colonised then better we have the British than the Japanese, the lesser of the two evils.

The whacking of Najib’s brother is the beginning of an onslaught that we are going to see against Najib. And do not clap and cheer too early. If Najib does fall, and unless someone from Pakatan Rakyat takes over, you may not like the alternative to Najib. You may, not long after that, be reminiscing about the ‘good old days’ when Najib was Prime Minister.

And if you had attended the briefing that Khir Toyo organised in Petaling Jaya -- where Dr Mahathir spoke -- soon after the 2008 general election, you will understand what I am talking about. What was discussed five years ago in 2008 is finally being implemented.

In fact, if you look at ‘Point 1’ of the Agreement, Sabah does not have any State religion. This would mean Islam is not the official religion of Sabah. And this would also mean, if a Muslim lives in Sabah, he or she can leave Islam and become a Christian or Atheist or whatever and there is nothing the government can do about it (unlike in West Malaysia where they can).

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

Raja Petra Kamarudin

The PKR vice president is in discussions with her lawyers to haul the Sabah government to court for barring her entry into the state

(FMT, 31 May 2013) - PKR vice president, Nurul Izzah Anwar, is planning legal action against the Sabah government for barring her for entering the state.

“I’m in consultation with my lawyers on the possible action to be taken against them,” said Nurul, who is also the MP for Lembah Pantai.

Nurul headed for Sabah yesterday on the invitation of PKR deputy secretary general and Penampang MP, Darrell Leiking, invitation to celebrate the Pesta Kaamatan in Penampang.

However on arrival, she was detained by the immigration officials allegedly under the instructions of the Sabah Chief Minister’s Department before being forcibly deported to KL.

It is learnt that the Immigration Department also informed Nurul that the Chief Minister’s department had also instructed them to not only bar her but many more personalities from Peninsula from entering Sabah henceforth.

“It’s a sad situation where Sabah is actually politicising security, and vengeance should not be practiced in security,” said Nurul. “Pakatan still welcomes everyone into PR governed states such as Penang and Selangor.”

Leiking, meanwhile condemned the Sabah Immigration Department and those who instructed them to bar her, saying that they should be ashamed of themselves.

“I challenge the Sabah Chief Minister and state’s cabinet to explain to the people of Sabah and Malaysia why this act transpired,” said Leiking.

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Today, Member of Parliament for Lembah Pantai Nurul Izzah Anwar was barred from entering Sabah. This is not the first time something like this has happened and will certainly not be the last time.

While this is most unfortunate and definitely violates one’s fundamental liberties -- something I have been arguing in support of for a very long time indeed (including the fundamental liberties of apostates and gays) we need to discuss this incident against the backdrop of what the opposition Pakatan Rakyat promised the Sabah people in the run-up to the recent general election less than a month ago. 

If you can remember, Pakatan Rakyat promised Sabah and Sarawak full-autonomy plus it promised to respect the terms and spirit of the 18- and 20-Point Agreements (plus it promised them an increase of the Oil Royalty from 5% to 20%). So we need to discuss the ‘deportation’ of Nurul Izzah against this backdrop -- a promise made by Pakatan Rakyat.

In short, this is what the opposition promised them and what happened is merely a fulfillment of this election promise.

According to ‘Point 6’ of the Agreement, Sabah has the absolute right to determine who can and cannot be allowed into Sabah. And no reason needs to be given in denying anyone entry into Sabah.

Is this fair? It may not be fair but this is what we promised them and they are just doing what we promised them and what is within their rights to do. According to the Agreement, they do have a right to do this. And according to what we promised them, we will honour and respect this right.

In fact, if you look at ‘Point 1’ of the Agreement, Sabah does not have any State religion. This would mean Islam is not the official religion of Sabah. And this would also mean, if a Muslim lives in Sabah, he or she can leave Islam and become a Christian or Atheist or whatever and there is nothing the government can do about it (unlike in West Malaysia where they can).

Furthermore, English is the official language of the state and all communications should be in English plus the government can close down Malay, Chinese and Tamil schools and force everyone to go to just English-medium schools.

Another point, and a very important point to note, is that the Federal Constitution of Malaya is no longer valid. And you cannot amend the Federal Constitution of Malaya and turn it into the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. You need to discard the current Federal Constitution and come out with a brand new Constitution.

That is what the opposition promised Sabah (and Sarawak). Hence Islam and Bahasa Malaysia should not be the official religion and language respectively for Sabah plus Sabah can decide on who can and cannot enter that state.

Hence can we therefore protest when they merely do what we promised them they could do? So we need to be careful about making election promises just so that we can win votes. Now we need to honour those promises and not protest when they act on those promises.

Have we painted ourselves into a corner? That may appear so.

**********************************************

The 20-point Agreement between the Federation of Malaya and Sabah

Point 1: Religion 

While there was no objection to Islam being the national religion of Malaysia there should be no State religion in North Borneo, and the provisions relating to Islam in the present Constitution of Malaya should not apply to North Borneo.

Point 2: Language

a. Malay should be the national language of the Federation.

b. English should continue to be used for a period of 10 years after Malaysia Day.

c. English should be an official language of North Borneo for all purposes, State or Federal, without limitation of time.

Point 3: Constitution

Whilst accepting that the present Constitution of the Federation of Malaya should form the basis of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Constitution of Malaysia should be a completely new document drafted and agreed in the light of a free association of states and should not be a series of amendments to a Constitution drafted and agreed by different states in totally different circumstances. A new Constitution for North Borneo was of course essential.

Point 6: Immigration

Control over immigration into any part of Malaysia from outside should rest with the Central Government but entry into North Borneo should also require the approval of the State Government. The Federal Government should not be able to veto the entry of persons into North Borneo for State Government purposes except on strictly security grounds. North Borneo should have unfettered control over the movements of persons other than those in Federal Government employ from other parts of Malaysia into North Borneo.

                                    **********************************************

這就是我們答應他們的

事實上，如果你去讀協議的第一點，你會發現沙巴根本就沒有任何官方宗教，這也表示回教根本就不是沙巴州的州屬宗教。這進而也表示，如果一個住在那兒的回教徒想要離教去信奉基督教或成爲無宗教主義者的話，政府是拿他沒辦法的（不像在西馬政府可以對他做出相對的懲罰）。

公正黨副主席正和她的律師商討就沙巴政府禁止她入境沙巴一事起訴該州政府。

(FMT, 2013年5月31日) - 公正黨副主席努魯伊莎打算採取法律行動對付沙巴政府。沙巴政府早前禁止她入境該地。

（下文省略）

**********************************************

Lembah Pantai國會議員努魯伊莎于今天早前被禁止入境沙巴州。這已不是第一次發生類似事件了，而這次也決不會成爲最後一次。

當然這是件很令人遺憾且很侵犯人權的事----我之前不止一次爭論此事的正確性（包括離教和同性自主等基本人權）----但我們還是要把這件事情和一個月前大選時反對黨對沙巴人民做出的承諾一併討論。

如果你還記得的話， 民聯曾答應要給予沙砂兩州完全的自主權以示他們對20點協議的尊重（他們也答應要把石油稅增加至20%）。所以我們必須把努魯被‘驅逐’一事和民聯作出的承諾連在一起討論。

簡短一點來講，以上所發生的正是民聯所答應的，而沙巴政府只是執行他們在大選時被承諾的諾言而已。

根據協議的第六點，沙巴擁有決對的權利來定奪某個人可不可以入境。他們可以拒絕任何人入境而不需給出任何理由。

這公平嗎？這可能很不公平，但這是我們之前承諾他們的，他們只是執行我們答應給他們的權利而已。根據協議所提，他們確實擁有這個權力，而根據我們所答應他們的，我們必須尊重他們的使用權。

事實上，如果你去讀協議的第一點，你會發現沙巴根本就沒有任何官方宗教，這也表示回教根本就不是沙巴州的州屬宗教。這進而也表示，如果一個住在那兒的回教徒想要離教去信奉基督教或成爲無宗教主義者的話，政府是拿他沒辦法的（不像在西馬政府可以對他做出相對的懲罰）。

不止如此，協議裏還提到英文是該州的官方語言，（州）政府還有權利迫令關閉馬來文，華文和淡米爾文學校和把所有人都送進英文學校。

還有一個很重要的重點，那就是馬來亞聯邦憲法是無效的，而你也不能把馬來亞聯邦憲改成馬來西亞聯邦憲法。你必須把現在的聯邦憲法給摒棄掉然後編寫一個全新的憲法。

這就是民聯答應沙巴（和砂勞越）的東西。所以說伊斯蘭教和馬來文不能成爲沙巴州的官方宗教和語言，還有就是沙巴政府決定讓不讓某個人進入沙巴州。

儅他們只是執行我們承諾他們的權力時，我們有立場反對他們嗎？所以說我們必須很小心地來給出選舉諾言，即使我們的目的只是要贏得選票。現在儅他們執行他們的使用權時，我們只能尊重我們的諾言而不是去反對他們。

我們是否已把我們自己逼進了死胡同裏了呢？我恐怕答案是‘是的’。

**********************************************

馬來亞聯邦和沙巴州的20點協議

第一點：宗教

在回教是馬來西亞國家官方宗教的同時，北婆儸洲是沒有州屬宗教的。而在馬來亞憲法内任何有關回教的條約在北婆儸洲是使無效的。

第二點：語言

a. 馬來文是聯邦的官方語言。

b. 在馬來西亞日後的十年裏，英文還是應該繼續被使用。

c. 在任何用途上，無論是有關州屬或是聯邦，英語將無限期地成爲北婆儸洲的官方語言。

第三點：憲法

雖然（雙方）都接受目前馬來亞聯邦憲法為馬來西亞憲法的根基，馬來西亞憲法應該是一個全新並且所有州屬都同意接受的起草，而不是一系列不同州屬在不同情況下修改的憲法的。（給予）北婆羅洲的一個新憲法是必不可少的。

第六點：移民

在馬來西亞任何地方，控制外來移民是國家政府的責任，但（要）入境北婆儸洲則必須先得到州政府的同意。聯邦政府無法否決任何人因州政府理由而入境北婆儸洲，除了治安安全課題以外。除了馬來西亞聯邦政府從馬來西亞其他地方把人雇用進來北婆儸洲以外，北婆儸洲將不受約束地全權控制人口的移動。

Umno leaders also realized that the British required inter-ethnic cooperation before a further political transition would take place. The Chinese on their part were forced to be restrained in their demands because the Emergency, which was seen as supported largely by Chinese, had placed the community under a political cloud. And after the 1955 elections when they had less seats than Umno, they realized that their bargaining position was weaker. There must be appreciation that the Constitution was drawn up in a context of compromise and consensus so as to forge a united front in the fight for independence. Today there is an urgency to retrieve and regain that spirit of mutual respect and understanding to build a cohesive Malaysia that can thrive in an increasingly globalising and competitive world.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

By Lee Kam Hing, CPI (7 February 2010)

Road to Independence (3): Inherent tension in the Constitution

Drafting the Malayan Constitution: Compromises and Consensus, 1956-57

The sequence of political events leading to independence, according to Donald Horowitz, was a factor in consolidating a coalition of ethnic-based parties that proved to be enduring. At the pre-independence stage components members of the Alliance were forced to arrive at compromises in order to present a common stand in independence discussions. And they were more willing to make concessions to one another to maintain the inter-ethnic coalition, a condition stipulated by the British before any transfer of power could take place.

There were several stages in the negotiations for a new constitution. Of these the most important were the preparation of the Alliance Memorandum (April-September 1956), the Reid Commission (19 June 1956-21 February 1957), and the tripartite Working Party (22 February-27 April 1957). The Alliance Memorandum was one of several from different organisations that were submitted but it was the one which the Reid Commission paid most attention to since this came from the majority party in the Federal Legislative Council. The Alliance Memorandum was finalised after crucial concessions were obtained from all sides within the coalition.

The Reid Commission was entrusted with drafting the Constitution after taking into account the views of different groups. The tripartite Working Party, which included representatives from the Alliance, the Malay rulers and the British, met between 22 February and 27 April 1957 to go through each item in the draft constitution. This was to ensure that the new constitution would be acceptable to the major communities. Some significant amendments were made at this final stage although the general structure of the draft constitution was retained.

Articles in the Constitution on citizenship, Malay special position, language, and religion were the most sensitive and were closely scrutinised and debated. Throughout these discussions, Umno and the non-Malay Alliance leaders had to contend with very communal demands from radical sections of their communities. Over the years since then, these Articles in the Constitution have continued to be major sources of disagreement and a bone of contention in inter-ethnic relations.

Jus soli

Members of the Alliance agreed on the application of jus soli for citizenship so that those born in the Federation after independence became citizens and non-residents could qualify by fulfilling residence, language and oath of loyalty requirements. This liberal citizenship requirement was a major concession from the Malays because with this agreement, large number of non-Malays became citizens.

The Alliance, which insisted on a single nationality, also eventually accepted the Reid Commission’s inclusion of modified dual-citizenship especially for those from the Straits Settlements who were British subjects.²⁶

In exchange for liberalising citizenship requirements, non-Malay leaders in the Alliance accepted the special position of the Malays. Umno wanted to continue with Malay privileges as provided under the Federation of Malaya Agreement through provisions for Malay reservation land, operation of quotas within the public services, quotas for licenses and permits for certain businesses, and quotas for public scholarship and education grants.

Malay special position

There was the intention both in the Alliance and the Reid Commission that the provision in Article 157 (becoming Article 153 in the final version of the Constitution) on Malay special position should be transitional.

In the earlier drafts of the Alliance memorandum it was stated that the special position provision in the Constitution would be reviewed 15 years after independence. However, this was omitted in the final version to avoid criticisms from Malay organisations although it was conveyed orally to the Reid Commission. The majority of members in the Reid Commission was uncomfortable with the provision in the Alliance Memorandum as they considered it incompatible with democracy and fundamental rights

Amendments were made to Article 157 at the tripartite talks in April 1957. As a result of strong UMNO representation, it was decided that the special position of the Malays be reviewed from time to time instead of a stated fixed period. The Agong would have the responsibility for safeguarding the “special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities."²⁷

Furthermore, Article 157 was also transferred from the transitional provisions of the Constitution to the permanent section at the final meeting of the Working Party on 27 April 1957. It was also decided that the government should have the flexibility to extend the areas classified as Malay reservations.²⁸

MCA was unhappy with the amendment made to Article 157. Its representatives to the talks had failed to realize the implications particularly that future amendments to Articles in the permanent section of the Constitution required a two-thirds majority of total number of members of each House of Parliament.

Nevertheless, this transfer was made on an understanding that the White Paper to be tabled at the Federal Legislative meeting should include a statement that “it is considered in the interests of the country and in the interests of the Malays themselves that the provisions of Article 157 should be reviewed from time to time."²⁹

Furthermore, following MCA’s expression of concern that Article 157 provision should be carefully worded, it was agreed that a protective clause be included which stated that “Nothing in this article shall empower Parliament to restrict or control any trade or business just for the sake of creating quotas for Malays^."30

Islam

It was at the tripartite negotiations that an Article making Islam the official religion of the Federation was introduced. The majority in the Reid Commission had favoured retaining religion as a state matter. They feared that providing an official religion, as proposed earlier in the Alliance memorandum, was a contradiction to the status of a secular state.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, under pressure from Umno, argued that the inclusion of Article 3 was important psychologically to the Malays. However in recognising the objections of the rulers and the concerns of non-Malays, two provisos were included in the Article. The Article, accordingly, would not affect the position of the rulers in their respective states as head of Islam and the practice and propagation of other religions in the Federation would be assured.³¹

Although there were strong objections from non-Muslim organisations to the Article, the MCA and the MIC were assured by Umno that Islam was intended to have only symbolic significance and for ceremonial purposes only, and that the rights of the non-Muslims would not be affected. Article 11 guaranteed the right of the citizens to “profess, practise and propagate their religion. The Federation would be a secular state."³²

Language

There was also a compromise on language. The Alliance agreed to Umno’s proposal that Malay be the official language but that there would be no objections to the use of Chinese and Tamil for unofficial purposes. The Tunku also assured Chinese educationalists that Chinese schools, language and culture would be preserved. The tripartite Working Party agreed to a proviso in Article 140 on language allowing the teaching and learning of Chinese and Tamil.

English was to be retained as official language for ten years after independence and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provided.

Finally, the Malay rulers were to be constitutional monarchs and they would act on the advice of the Cabinet. In the tripartite meeting it was agreed that the rulers would be consulted on matters affecting their positions, territorial changes, changes affecting the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities, and in the appointment of important commissions such as the Election Commission and the Public Service commission.

Conclusion

Consensus was reached among the leaders at the constitutional talks on what were undoubtedly sensitive and difficult issues. Efforts were made to ensure that the core interests of all the communities were safeguarded. Though the constitutional provisions did not satisfy everyone there were key compromises made which enabled the members of the Alliance to work together towards independence.

The Constitution which the founding leaders of Malaysia helped bring to fruition has since the provided the parameters of all subsequent discourses on inter-ethnic relations.

But over the years, the inherent tension in a number of Articles of the Constitution have surfaced.

Members of the various communities have claimed that the interests of their constituencies as provided in the Constitution had not been protected or advanced and these concerns have been taken up by opposition parties and even component members of the ruling coalition. There have also been calls for review of some of the provisions in the Constitution.

At the same time, some Malays have argued that the community was not receiving the full benefits of their special position in exchange for granting citizenship to non-Malays. While non-Malays were granted immediate citizenship, the Malay community was still lagging behind economically and Malay was not as widely used as the official language.

Many non-Malays, on their part, perceive that the Constitution has favoured the Malays and want to redress the bias so as to ensure fairer access to educational and employment opportunities in the government sector as well for to bring about the wider use of other languages and the development of vernacular-language schools.

So long as the founding leaders were still around and the mystique of the Alliance as the party of independence remained, it was possible to contain the deep unhappiness of all communities. The hope of the early leaders was that with economic growth and equitable distribution, a maturing democracy, and continued inter-ethnic cooperation, the contentious issues would gradually fade away.

Inter-ethnic cooperation was forged during a period of political transition in the pre-independence years. Donald Horowitz contends that the sequence of events was decisive in the formation of the Alliance and in the willingness of leaders of the component parties to reach agreement during constitutional talks.

Prior to the Alliance, there had been efforts at inter-ethnic cooperation and thus when Umno and MCA formalised their partnership it was not an entirely new or uncharted experience. Horowitrz suggested that the Alliance could be looked upon as a creation of chance “a curious and irreplicable combination of circumstances".

There was the Emergency and British colonial policy which pushed Umno and MCA together; that elections were held first for town councils where voters were mainly Chinese, and that there were no strong competing communal parties. In these circumstances, Umno as the leading Malay party was willing to reach across ethnic lines to work with the MCA in order to defeat the IMP, its main threat.

Umno leaders also realized that the British required inter-ethnic cooperation before a further political transition would take place. The Chinese on their part were forced to be restrained in their demands because the Emergency, which was seen as supported largely by Chinese, had placed the community under a political cloud. And after the 1955 elections when they had less seats than Umno, they realized that their bargaining position was weaker.³³

Horowitz also argued that leaders of the Alliance had time to develop a close relationship even before they needed to face ‘divisive’ issues. The electoral battles they fought together and the difficulties they encountered with the colonial authorities bonded them in friendship. They were willing to make compromises in a spirit of give and take in order to maintain a united front when negotiating with the colonial authorities for independence.

Fifty years after independence there is a need to renew our understanding of how leaders of the various ethnic groups came together to create a political coalition, to relearn of the different stages in the drafting of the Constitution, and to be aware of what the founding leaders agreed on with regard to citizenship, Malay special position, the place of Islam in this country, education and language, and the role of the Malay rulers.

There must be appreciation that the Constitution was drawn up in a context of compromise and consensus so as to forge a united front in the fight for independence. Today there is an urgency to retrieve and regain that spirit of mutual respect and understanding to build a cohesive Malaysia that can thrive in an increasingly globalising and competitive world.

********************************************************

Dr Lee Kam Hing’s essay is originally titled ‘Forging Inter-ethnic Cooperation: The Political and Constitutional Process towards Independence, 1951-1957’ and published in the book Multiethnic Malaysia — Past Present and Future (2009).

CPI with permission from the author is reproducing his essay in three parts for online reading in our website. Today’s Part 3 is as above.

Dr Lee is research director at Star Publications. He was visiting Harvard-Yenching research scholar at Harvard University, and visiting scholar at Wofson College, Cambridge University. He was previously history professor of Universiti Malaya.

TO BE CONTINUED

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Footnotes:

²⁶ Those who held an additional nationality were given a year to decide if they wanted federation nationality while the introduction of a Commonwealth citizenship status allowed Commonwealth countries to grant certain privileges to citizens from other countries. Joseph Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution, pp. 124-126, pp.160-161.

²⁷ Ibid, p.164

²⁸ Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, pp.177-179

²⁹ Joseph Fernando, The Making of the Malaysian Constitution, p.164

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Tun Mohd Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1976, pp.245-249; H.P.Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.4-21

³² K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965, pp.117-126

³³ Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985 pp.396-440

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Bibliography

Adnan Hj Mohd Nawang, Za’ba (Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad) dan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn Bhd, 1998

Ampalavanar, R., The Indian Minority and Political Change in Malaya, 1945-1957, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981

Arasaratnam, S., Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London: Institute of Race Relations, 1967

Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945-1950, Oxford University Press, 1993

Cheah Boon Kheng, The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002

Cloake, J. Templer: Tiger of Malaya, London: Harrap, 1985

Clutterbuck, R., Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, London: Faber and Faber, 1973

Emerson, Rupert, E., Malaysia: A Study of Direct and Indirect Rule, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1964

Fernando, J.M., The Making of the Malayan Constitution, Kuala Lumpur Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Monograph No 31, 2002

Firdaus Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1985

Funston, J., Malay Politics in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980

Furnivall, J.S., Netherlands India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939

Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971

Heng Pek Khoon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988

Heussler, Robert, Completing a Stewardship, London: Greenwood Press, 1983

Hickling, R.H., An Introduction to the Federal Constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1960

Horowitz, D.L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985

Loh Kok Wah, Francis, Beyond the Tin Mines, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988

Husin Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990

Means, G.P. Malaysian Politics, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976

Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1974

Mohamed Suffian Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1972

Mohamed Suffian Hashim, Lee, H.P. and Trindale, F.A. (eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978

Ramlah Adam, Dato’ Onn Ja’afar: Pengasas Kemerdekaan, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustakaa, 1993

Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965

Roff, W.R., The Origins of Malaya Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967

Sheridan, L.A. and Groves, H.E., The Constitution of Malaysia, Singapore: Malayan Law Journal

Stockwell, Anthony J., Malaya, London: HMSO, 1995

Stubbs, Richard, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989

Tan Liok Ee, The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: Community and Nations in Tension, the Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955, Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1988

The Umno-MCA alliance could have turned out to be no more than a temporary arrangement of convenience. Given that the first real electoral contest took place in Kuala Lumpur which was largely Chinese-majority, Umno found it necessary to work with MCA to defeat its rival, the IMP. Had elections been held elsewhere where Chinese votes were insignificant, there might not have been a reason for Umno to seek a Chinese electoral partner. Nevertheless in 1952 it was more than just electoral battles that led Umno and MCA to work together. They now had to forge a common front to negotiate with the British on constitutional change.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

By Lee Kam Hing, CPI (6 February 2010)

Road to Independence (2): MCA’s missed opportunity

Local elections: The demise of the IMP and the emergence of the Alliance Party, 1952

In late 1951, local elections were introduced in Malaya to prepare the country for self-government. The first election was in Penang in December 1951. But it was in Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital and where IMP was contesting for the first time, that the elections in February 1952, attracted wide interest.

The Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which fielded candidates in all 12 wards seemed formidable, having on its side Onn Jaafar, founder-leader of Umno, and Tan Cheng Lock, founder-leader of the MCA. Several other senior MCA leaders including Tan Siew Sin, Khoo Teik Ee and Yong Shook Lin were with the IMP too. The IMP was also supported by the MIC.

Selangor MCA, then headed by H.S. Lee, reached an agreement with Dato Yahya Razak, chairman of KL Umno’s election committee to field a single slate of candidates. Lee’s election manifesto which was released on 3 January stated that “the MCA Selangor Branch are also of the opinion that the interests of members of other communities should also be represented."

This had attracted Yahya’s attention. He thereupon contacted a former school-mate Ong Yoke Lin, another MCA leader, who then fixed a meeting of representatives from Umno and MCA. On 7 January both sides agreed to fight jointly in the elections. The alliance fielded 5 Malays, 6 Chinese, and 1 Indian.¹²

The KL electoral pact was an entirely local initiative but the alliance drew strong criticisms not only from IMP but also from some MCA and Umno national leaders. Yahya Razak’s own division head Datin Putih Mariah resigned on 10 February just days before elections in protest at the pact. There were objections from other branches and Yahya was accused of selling out the Malays by working with a Chinese party.

On the MCA side, two senior leaders Tan Siew Sin and Khoo Teik Ee declared during the elections campaign that the party’s central working committee had not approved the Umno-MCA merger and both instead called for support of the IMP.

For MCA this was its first experience in participating in elections while for Umno it needed to improve on its Penang performance where it won only one seat. Both Lee and Yahya saw the elections initially as a battle for control of the KL Municipal and focused on local issues. But the elections turned out to be a test of strength between Onn Jaafar’s multi-racial IMP and the communally-based Umno and MCA, and soon questions of self-government and larger political concerns were raised.¹³

To the surprise of some observers, the Umno-MCA alliance defeated the IMP by winning 9 of the 12 seats at the KL elections.

Contemporary commentaries while suggesting that the “MCA-Umno victory is superficially proof that the Malays and the Chinese can work together for political ends noted that voting was along ethnic lines for both parties."¹⁴ Although the electorate numbered only about 11,000 and turnout was 75%, the result was a major boost to the new alliance and it marked the beginning of IMP’s demise.

The new alliance of Umno-MCA maintained its winning momentum and swept municipal elections held in the rest of the country later that year.

Formalising inter-ethnic cooperation in the Alliance, 1952-53

As observed, inter-ethnic cooperation in Malaya could have taken either the multi-racial IMP form or in the form of a coalition of communal-based parties. Tan Cheng Lock, on his part, remained cautious about an Umno-MCA alliance. He believed that several important issues had to be resolved before he was agreeable to formalising Umno-MCA collaboration.

He wanted to find out whether Tunku Abdul Rahman, the new leader of Umno, accepted jus soli in relation to the citizenship issue and the concept of a Malaya for Malayans. Writing to H.S. Lee on 29 February Tan explained that “there must be communal equality in the Federation involving equality of opportunity and treatment and in shouldering the duties and in sharing the rights of Malaya Citizenship among all the domicile communities making up the population of Malaya.¹⁵

Tan and other mainly Western-educated MCA leaders had initially embraced Onn’s non-racial IMP and saw it as moderate compared to Umno. In particular Tan appreciated Onn’s willingness to stake his position as Umno president by insisting on liberalising citizenship requirements and opening the party to non-Malays.

It would appear that in 1952, the IMP with its multiracial platform as well as the quiet backing by the British was the preferred party to work with for some of the senior leaders of MCA. The IMP too was supported by the MIC. Many MCA leaders were unsure of the untested Tunku who had taken over Umno in August 1951.

Then why did Tan break off with Onn? Some studies criticized Tan for letting Onn down. If Tan and the MCA had sided with IMP instead of Umno, could the whole political scenario for the country have changed? Could we have a situation of a dominant or competing multi-racial parties instead of a coalition of ethnic parties leading the independence movement?

H.S. Lee favoured expanding the Umno-MCA alliance. In the weeks after the KL elections, Lee was in regular contact with the Tunku. The Tunku was the first to congratulate Lee on the KL election results. On 22 February Lee informed Tan that the Tunku favoured enlarging the alliance into a nation-wide organisation and that the Umno leader would be asking party heads to contact the various local MCA branches.¹⁶

H.S. Lee’s role in events affecting Umno-MCA alliance was crucial. He was worried about the continued association of Tan Cheng Lock with the IMP. On 22 March 1952 he wrote to Tan that senior MCA state leaders had expressed to him their deep concern about Tan calling an inaugural IMP Malacca meeting, and there was a possibility that he would be made state chairman while still leader of the MCA. More importantly, Lee wrote, “They feel that if you accept the Presidency of the IMP in Malacca, it might not be conducive for frank discussions with the Umno in the future."¹⁷

Unwilling to abandon Onn and the IMP, Tan proposed giving MCA branches the right to work with either IMP or Umno. Speaking to the press on 18 February 1952, Tan declared, “I support the principle of IMP-MCA-Umno cooperation."¹⁸ To Lee on 22 February he explained, “You are materially aware that influential members of the MCA want cooperation with IMP. So probably the MCA is divided on this question.^"19

Umno, which regarded IMP as its main rival, would certainly not have accepted Tan’s proposition. And neither did Lee and the more politically conservative Chinese. Writing to Tan on 1 March 1952 Lee revealed that the Tunku indicated to him privately that he accepted jus soli although there was a minority within Umno strongly opposed to such a concession.

It might have been, as some writers had argued, that Lee preferred an Umno-MCA alliance because he and Onn were not on good personal terms. But correspondence at the end of 1951 showed that there was cordiality between the two leaders and even after IMP’s inaugural meeting Onn again invited Lee to join IMP.²⁰

Rather, Lee did not believe that the multi-racial IMP could get popular support. On 18 February 1952, Lee wrote that “...it seems unlikely that the IMP will be able to achieve any success elsewhere. Indeed they have obtained the two seats [in Kuala Lumpur] by a very small margin (50 odd votes)..." ²¹

Lee’s stand was more likely influenced by his association with groups in the MCA which were worried about the future of Chinese education, language, and citizenship. These groups believed that the Chinese were politically weak and divided, and a distinctly Chinese party was therefore needed to safeguard the community’s interest especially at a time when British policies were interpreted as anti-Chinese. They therefore believed that MCA’s future could best be pursued by retaining its identity, and therefore an alliance with another communal party like Umno was a more suitable and workable option.²²

Lee managed to eventually bring Tan to his viewpoint. On 5 March, Lee alerted Tan to the Select Committee’s Report on the Immigration Ordinance of 1950. Onn was a signatory to the Majority Report with recommendations unfavourable to the Chinese and this was opposed by Chinese members of the Legislative Council. Lee therefore raised doubts in the mind of Tan about Onn’s commitment to multi-racial fairness.²³

Eventually, Tunku and Tan Cheng Lock met on 18 March. After several more rounds of talks involving other MCA leaders, a nation-wide Umno-MCA alliance was institutionalised.

Consolidating inter-ethnic coalition, 1953-55

The Umno-MCA alliance could have turned out to be no more than a temporary arrangement of convenience. Given that the first real electoral contest took place in Kuala Lumpur which was largely Chinese-majority, Umno found it necessary to work with MCA to defeat its rival, the IMP.

Had elections been held elsewhere where Chinese votes were insignificant, there might not have been a reason for Umno to seek a Chinese electoral partner. Nevertheless in 1952 it was more than just electoral battles that led Umno and MCA to work together. They now had to forge a common front to negotiate with the British on constitutional change.²⁴

In March 1953 the coalition declared that its aim was to achieve self-government and eventual independence in Malaya. As a first step, the Alliance called for elections to the Federal Legislative Council and for at least 60 per cent of seats be elected directly by the people. Up until then, Council’s members had all been nominated

The Alliance leaders encountered resistance from the British over their demands for political reforms. The British still favoured the non-communal IMP and disregarded the political strength of the Alliance as revealed in the elections. Furthermore, some colonial administrations were not convinced that Malaya was ready for independence and they anticipated a long period of British mandated rule.

On 1 February 1954 the committee set up by the colonial administration to look into federal elections recommended that only 44 of the 92 members of the Federal Legislative Council, or less than half, would be elected. Significantly too, the committee did not recommend early elections.

On further discussions, the number of elected seats was raised to 52 out of 98 seats. But Alliance leaders rejected the proposal and sent a delegation to raise the matter with the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Oliver Lyttelton. The Secretary of State turned down the request for 60 per cent of elected members.

In reaction, the Alliance called for an independent commission to consider constitutional reforms, failing which they would carry out a boycott of the government and withdraw all its representatives from the legislature, municipal, and town councils. This request was rejected and the Alliance members went ahead with the boycott. They organised a nation-wide demonstration and also met the Malay rulers to get support.

The boycott forced the British to come to a compromise. The Colonial Office proposed that five seats that would have been nominated by the High Commissioner should now be decided by the majority party in the Council. These five seats could then ensure an elected majority at the Federal Legislative Council.²⁵

In July 1955 the first federal elections were held. Dato Onn had disbanded the IMP and formed Parti Negara to contest the elections. The inter-ethnic Alliance coalition fielded candidates in all seats and in its manifesto promised that it would seek early independence. Now joined by the MIC, the Alliance won 51 of the 52 seats. It formed the first locally-elected government with Tunku Abdul Rahman as the first Chief Minister.

After the elections, the Alliance called on the British Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, to set up an independent commission to draw up a Constitution as a step towards independence for Malaya. Lennox-Boyd soon afterwards invited the Alliance to send a delegation for discussions in London.

Alliance leaders gained national support and prominence from the 1955 elections and won the right to negotiate for independence. They had enhanced their political position by taking a strong stand together against the colonial administration over the issue of federal elections. They were willing to risk detention by their boycott of the representative bodies.

In the end they succeeded because of the evolving inter-ethnic solidarity and by showing that they could act together. The experience created a bond of friendship and this enabled them to resolve contentious matters during negotiations for a new constitution and independence.

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Dr Lee Kam Hing’s essay is originally titled ‘Forging Inter-ethnic Cooperation: The Political and Constitutional Process towards Independence, 1951-1957’ and published in the book Multiethnic Malaysia — Past Present and Future (2009).

CPI with permission from the author is reproducing his essay in three parts for online reading in our website. Today’s Part 2 is as above.

Dr Lee is research director at Star Publications. He was visiting Harvard-Yenching research scholar at Harvard University, and visiting scholar at Wofson College, Cambridge University. He was previously history professor of Universiti Malaya.

TO BE CONTINUED

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Footnotes:

[12] Malay Mail. 15 February 1952

[13] Straits Times, 20 January 1952

[14] Singapore Standard, 19 February 1952

[15] Tan Cheng Lock to Col. H.S.Lee, 29 February 1952, Malacca, in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur

[16] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 5 March 1952; H.S.Lee to Tengku Abdul Rahman, 7 March1952, both letters in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur.

[17] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 3 March 1952, Kuala Lumpur, unpublished HS.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur

[18] Straits Times, 19 February 1952

[19] Tan Cheng Lock to Col H.S.Lee, 22 February 1952, Singapore, in unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur

[20] Dato Onn Jaafar to Col H.S.Lee, 4 September 1951, Kuala Lumpur, Unpublished H.S.Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur.

[21] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 18 February 1952, in unpublished H.S. Lee private papers, Kuala Lumpur

[22] Straits Times, 20 January 1952

[23] H.S.Lee to Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, 5 March 1952, Kuala Lumpur, in unpublished H.S.private papers, Kuala Lumpur

[24] Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp.179-220

[25] Joseph M.Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution, Kuala Lumpur: Monograph No 31 of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2002, pp 35-63

The Malay radicals had been marginalised in the talks among Umno, the British, and the rulers. The MNP saw the Federation Agreement as a move to maintain colonial rule in Malaya. The AMCJA-Putera called for a hartal on 20 October 1947 to protest against the Federation of Malaya Agreement. Towards the end of 1947, the government banned the AMCJA and Putera and most of their leaders, except for Tan, were arrested or went into exile. In June 1951, Dato Onn declared at the Umno General Assembly that independence could only be achieved if there was unity with the other races. He therefore proposed opening Umno membership to non-Malays and the party renamed as the United Malayan National Organisation.

THE CORRIDORS OF POWER

By Lee Kam Hing, CPI (5 February 2010)

Road to Independence (1): Birth of Umno and Malayan Union

Inter-ethnic cooperation was a prerequisite set by the British for the transfer of power to Malayans. The colonial authorities believed that the races needed to work together to create the necessary conditions for a smooth political transition and that this could then counter the Malayan Communist Party’s claim of being the only movement representing the people’s struggle. Local leaders themselves also accepted that only when the various races began working together could a start be made to the nation-building process.

Two forms of inter-ethnic cooperation were attempted in the pre-independence period. The first was a single multi-ethnic party, the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) and the second was a coalition of ethnic-based parties, the Alliance Party. Not without some significance, the founders of the ethnic-based political parties of the United Malay National Organisation (Umno), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) were directly involved in setting up IMP.

In the end it was the Alliance Party which prevailed over the multiethnic IMP. In 1955 the Alliance Party won resoundingly in the first federal elections and with this electoral success took the lead in negotiating for independence. Since then it has served as the dominant form of interracial cooperation.

Negotiations for the new nation’s Constitution in 1956 and 1957 involved difficult issues of a communal nature requiring tough bargaining among the leaders. Throughout the negotiations, however, a spirit of friendship and goodwill prevailed as the early leaders struggled to arrive at compromises to safeguard the interests of the respective communities.

Efforts were made to ensure that the Articles in the Constitution would be fair and balanced. This was not easy. The Constitution held inherent contradictions and tensions. Where it was possible in certain Articles, leaders chose to be silent on details because they feared that to do otherwise could provoke strong reaction from their respective communities and the resulting discord might jeopardise chances of early independence.

Still, differences in interpreting some of these Articles surfaced soon after independence and they gave rise to major political disputes. It was management of communal discord that remains the main challenge to inter-ethnic relations.

Inter-ethnic discourse took place within a changing political environment. There were the post-war ethnic disturbances in 1946 and the repercussions on race relations of the Emergency (1948-1960). At the same time, the British and the Malays realized that in the battle against the communists, the support of the Chinese was essential and that alienating the community from the mainstream of politics could undermine the political stability of the country. Increasingly, Chinese leaders were aware of their weaker bargaining position because sections of the Chinese community were implicated in the insurrection and also because after the 1955 federal elections, UMNO had a predominant share of seats won.

All sides recognized the need to work with one another and to reach compromises even though these might not satisfy fully their own communities. Achieving independence was foremost in their minds and this united them.

Efforts to achieve inter-ethnic political cooperation in Malaya have been relatively recent. While Chinese business leaders and Malay rulers developed commercial collaboration in the past, the rest of the respective communities had generally lived in defined and separate economic sectors, mixing only in the market place in what J. Furnivall termed as a plural society.

This separateness was further underlined by a growing but divergent political consciousness among the various communities in the early 20^th century. Whilst the Malay community came under the influence of Pan Islamism and Indonesian nationalism, the Chinese were attracted to the reformist and revolutionary politics of China, and the Indians had their political influence stemming from the anti-British independence movement in India.¹

This rising political consciousness instilled a sense of solidarity within each of the communities and a determination to protect the rights and interest of its members. Malay leaders in the pre-war years such as Dato Onn Jaafar and Zainal Abidin Ahmad (Za’ba) spoke out against government neglect of Malay welfare and expressed anxiety that the Malay population would be outnumbered by the continued inflow of Chinese migrants into the country, and they called on the colonial authorities to halt Chinese immigration.²

Chinese and Indian leaders, meanwhile, were divided between concerns in Malaya and what some still regarded as their homeland in China and India. Increasingly they were critical of colonial neglect of the educational and employment needs of their communities especially in the Depression years when price of tin and rubber fell. There were fears of social and labour unrest and dissatisfaction with the lack of government efforts to provide social relief.

Inter-ethnic relations deteriorated dangerously in the months after the Second World War. Japanese treatment of Chinese during the Occupation had been harsh while a policy to win over the Malays was practised.

In the immediate post-war days, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, mainly Chinese, attacked those they considered collaborators. Many of the MPAJA victims were Malays and the retaliation from the community took on an ethnic dimension. Serious clashes occurred in Johor and in Perak. Significantly, one leader who played a major role in calming the situation was Dato Onn Jaafar, an emerging Malay leader from Johor. He brought community leaders together and organised relief operations in the affected areas.³

Then in the early months of 1946, the Malays mobilised themselves to oppose British plans to set up the Malayan Union. The Malayan Union would have led to the liberalising of citizenship requirements for non-Malays and the loss by Malay rulers’ of their sovereignty. The plan was strongly resisted by the Malays. Dato Onn led the opposition against the Malayan Union.

On 11 May 1946 Umno was formed with Dato Onn elected as its President. For the first time, the Malays in the country were united under one organisation. Faced with mass demonstrations and boycotts by the sultans, the British agreed to negotiate with Umno and the Malay rulers. The resulting 1948 Federation of Malaya agreement, which replaced the Malayan Union, included terms favourable to the Malays.⁴

Soon afterwards, moves were made to form a party to unite and represent the Chinese. The MCA was formed during what were probably the most troubling time for the Chinese. The community was still recovering from the difficult, and at times dangerous, years of the Japanese Occupation. Now in 1948 they were caught between an armed rebellion that was communist-led but largely Chinese-supported and a colonial regime seen increasingly as pro-Malay.

Nearly half a million people, mostly Chinese, were – as a consequence – resettled in the New Villages. Facing such a situation, many Chinese saw an urgent need to have a party to rally the community together and to represent them in the constitutional discussions that were expected.

Sir Henry Gurney, High Commissioner of Malaya, was keen that anti-communist Chinese should help fight the MCP-led insurrection. In December 1948, Gurney met 16 Chinese members of the Federal Legislative Council and assured them that the British supported the forming of a Chinese organisation.⁵ For several weeks then, Chinese guilds and association all over the country held meetings to select delegates to the inaugural meeting.

At a gathering on 27 February 1949 the MCA was formed and Tan Cheng Lock, a Straits Chinese leader, was elected president. In the subsequent months, the party was preoccupied with welfare work in the New Villages where a third of the Chinese population had been resettled.⁶

Political consciousness and mobilisation among the Indians drew inspiration from events in India. Many Indians sympathised with the independence struggle in India and during the war a number joined the Indian Independence League and its armed wing, the Indian National Army.

After the war, Jawaharlal Nehru, a leader of the Indian Congress Party, visited Malaya, and at his suggestion a conference was held on 29 August 1946 to encourage active involvement of Indians in Malayan affairs. In that meeting, the Malayan Indian Congress was formed.⁷

Early efforts at inter-ethnic cooperation, 1946-1951

Both Tan Cheng Lock and Dato Onn Jaafar, although founders of ethnic-based parties, were also conscious very early of the need to develop inter-ethnic cooperation.

Tan was most aware of impending political change. He also had a keener sense than any other Chinese leader of what Malay aspirations were. There was recognition that in any political transition Chinese interest would be safeguarded only through cooperation with the British and to an extent with the Malays too.

When the Malayan Union which liberalized citizenship requirements was announced, Tan saw the proposals as offering hope to the non-Malays. Tan was therefore very disappointed when the British abandoned the Malayan Union in the face of strong Malay opposition.

He pointed out to the British the unique opportunity they had to weld together the different peoples in Malaya into one united nation. Tan called on British commitment to a democracy where there would be equality in rights and obligations for all. He strongly criticized the colonial authorities in October 1946 when they proceeded to discuss only with Umno and the Malay rulers on constitutional changes.⁸

There was a sense of bitterness in Tan when the proposals of the Federation of Malaya Agreement were made public. He criticized what he described as a pro-Malay character of the Federation proposal.

Tan thereupon took a more pronounced anti-colonial stance and sought out other political groups to oppose the Federation of Malaya Agreement proposals. On 7th December 1946 he together with leaders of the Malayan Democratic Union formed the Pan (later All) -Malayan Council for Joint Action. The MDU, multi-racial but mostly non-Malay led, modelled itself on the left-wing of the British Labour Party. The AMCJA in mid-1947 February linked up with several radical Malay organisations led by the Malay National Party.

Among Malay leaders in the MNP were Musa Ahmad, Ahmad Boestamam, Aziz Ishak and Dr Burhannuddin Al-helmy. They joined other Malay dissidents to form Putera in February 1947.

The Malay radicals had been marginalised in the talks among Umno, the British, and the rulers. The MNP saw the Federation Agreement as a move to maintain colonial rule in Malaya. The AMCJA-Putera called for a hartal on 20 October 1947 to protest against the Federation of Malaya Agreement. Towards the end of 1947, the government banned the AMCJA and Putera and most of their leaders, except for Tan, were arrested or went into exile.⁹

For Dato Onn, the shift from a narrow communal stance to a more inclusive approach in Malayan politics came following the signing of the Federation of Malaya Agreement. In 1949 he called on the Malays “to obtain closer ties with the other people in this country.¹⁰ Now seeking self-government and eventual independence, he wanted greater accommodation with non-Malays who had settled in Malaya and he persuaded Umno to change the party slogan from ‘Hidup Melayu’ to ‘Merdeka’.

Meanwhile Sir Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, set up the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) in 1949 to provide a platform to help resolve political differences among the various communities. There was inter-ethnic unease lingering from the immediate post-war months and this was heightened by the outbreak of a largely Chinese communist insurrection. Tan and Dato Onn, as leaders of the two major communities were brought into the CLC and both tried to work out a more enduring inter-ethnic understanding.

At the CLC Tun Tan and Dato Onn developed a friendship and through this reached some broad agreement to resolve contentious issues affecting inter-ethnic relations. Citizenship based on jus soli for non-Malays and special rights for Malays were the two pressing issues. Dato Onn agreed to liberalise citizenship requirements for non-Malays while Tan supported the Malay special position. Both agreed that the future government of Malaya should be multiracial and as well as one that was inclusive.

In June 1951, Dato Onn declared at the Umno General Assembly that independence could only be achieved if there was unity with the other races.¹¹ He therefore proposed opening Umno membership to non-Malays and the party renamed as the United Malayan National Organisation. It has been suggested that Malcolm MacDonald encouraged Dato Onn to take the new position. But it could argued that Dato Onn himself recognized the political realities of the changing times and hence this accounted for his bold approach regarding working with the other races.

However, while senior party officials were prepared to accept Dato Onn’s proposal, the general body within the party rejected moves to open Umno to other races. Unable to gain wide acceptance to his proposals, Dato Onn left Umno to set up the non-communal IMP on 16 September 1951. Tan supported Dato Onn and the IMP. He chaired the inaugural IMP meeting in Kuala Lumpur and headed the party’s Malacca branch. Tan was joined by several senior MCA leaders including Tan Siew Sin, Khoo Teik Ee and Yoong Shook Lin.

These early efforts by leaders of different communities to work together were tentative and temporary. The promoters of the experiment such as the AMPAJA-Putera collaboration and the CLC had to reconcile almost irreconcilable positions involving communal issues. But these attempts laid the groundwork for future inter-ethnic partnership that were more sustained.

TO BE CONTINUED

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Footnotes:

[1] William Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, pp. 56-90; Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 36-145

[2] Abdullah Hussain dan Khalid M.Hussein, Pendeta Za’ba dalam Kenangan, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2000. pp.188-233; Adnan Hj. Nawang, Za’ba dan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing Sdn Bhd 1998, pp. 160-219; Adnan Hj. Nawang, Memoir Za’ba, Tanjong Malim: Univesiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris, 2005, pp.50-73

[3] Cheah Boon Kheng, The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp. 1-48;Ramlah Adam, Dato Onn Ja’afar: Pengasas Kemerdekaan, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992, pp.58-80

[4] Gordon P.Means, Malaysian Politics, London: University of London Press,1970, pp. 99-102

[5] Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds of Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.202-203

[6] Heng Pek Koon,??? Cheng Lock’s Vision and Mission???, The Star, 9 July 2007; Fujio Hara, Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1997, pp. 53-77

[7] S.Arasaratnam, S., Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London: Institute of Race Relations, 1967,pp. 112-113

[8] Tjoa Hock Guan,??? The Social and Political Ideas of Tun Datuk Sir Tan Cheng Lock???, in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (eds), Melaka: The Transformation of a Malay Capital, 1400-1980 Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies/Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 299-323.

[9] K.G. Tregonning, ‘Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist???, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.X No.1, March 1979, pp.25-76

[10] Joseph Fernando, “The Rebel in Onn Jaafar???, The Star, 18 June 2007

[11] Ibid